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1 Predicates and theta-role
assignment
In this chapter I offer a definition of predicate and a theory of theta-role
assignment, and I distinguish arguments of a lexical item from role
players of a predicate. What follows is an aformal discussion that will lay
the necessary foundation for chapter 2 and the rest of this book. It will be
easy for the reader to find formal approaches to these issues in the
linguistic literature. The reason for an aformal discussion will become
apparent as the relevant issues are examined.
This chapter will establish three major points:
(A) Predicates are semantic entities that need not have any particular
syntactic characteristics;
(B) The relationship of a predicate to its role players is distinct from,
although highly coincidental with, theta role assignment from a lexical
item to its arguments. I modify a term from Marantz (1984) and say that
predicates assign Semantic Roles to their role players. The schema I will
defend is the following:
Semantic Role
Predicate Role Player
Theta Role
Lexical Item Argument
where the arrow represents the direction of assignment of the Semantic
Role or Theta Role;
(C) Typically the lexical heads N (noun), A (adjective), and V (verb) head a
predicate, although there are uses in which P (preposition) may also
head a predicate.
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An event-structure approach to predicates 7
1 An event-structure approach to predicates
A clause typically corresponds to the semantic notion of proposition, in
which we have some state or action expressed and a group (which may
consist of one or more) of participants or role players in that state or
action. (For a discussion of what a STATE word and an ACTION word are,
see Jackendoff 1983.) I lump together states and actions under the term
''event". In (1-1), for example, the event is the action of lending and the
role players are a lender, an object lent, and someone who has received
the object lent.
(1-1) Jean lent Mary books.
In this book I analyze a sentence such as (1-1) as containing the
predicate lent (marked in boldface in (1-1)) and the three role players for
that predicate: Jean, Mary, and books (and see Halliday 1970 and
Matthews 1981, among many others, for a similar event structure analysis
of propositional structure). Immediately, then, we can see a first formula-
tion of an informal definition of predicate: an event word which takes one
or more role players, where the term "event" covers both states and
actions. (In sec. 1.5 below I discuss the necessity for at least one role
player per predicate.)
Certainly there are other ways to analyze (1-1), still thinking of it in
terms of an event and role players. For example, we could view the event
as being one of lending books. With that idea in mind, the predicate
would be the discontinuous string lent. . . books and there would be only
two role players: Jean and Mary. (That predicates can be discontinuous
strings is shown below in sec. 1.2.) We could as easily view the event as
being one of Jean lending to Mary, in which case the predicate would be
the string Jean lent Mary and the role player would be books. Or we could
view lent Mary as an event and see Jean and books as the role players.
And so on. That is, we could view lent alone or in combination with any
one or more nominal in (1-1) as a predicate, so long as there is at least one
role player.
So far as I can see, there is no a priori basis upon which to choose
between these possibilities. (We will see ample evidence against the claim
that a predicate must be a maximal projection below in sees. 2.5 and 2.6
and in ch. 2, sees. 3 and 4.) Thus we must look to how language treats the
syntactic entities that participate in the make-up of a semantic proposi-
tion when determining which entities correspond to a predicate and
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8 Theta assignment
which entities correspond to role players. That is, we must base our
analysis on the syntactic and semantic behavior of these entities.
In this chapter I argue that an event lexical item is the "head" (as I will
define the term below) of a predicate and that the event lexical item
assigns a thematic (theta) role to the role players. Theta assignment will
be seen to treat all role players equally (see, in particular, sec. 2.5, where
I argue against the claim that VP assigns a theta role to the item in
syntactic subject position). It is primarily upon the basis of theta-role
assignment behavior that I have decided to analyze a sentence like (1-1)
as having only lent be the predicate, with all the nominals being role
players (but we will see in sec. 3 below that items other than nominals may
be role players).
There is at least one instance, however, in which I believe it makes
sense (from an empirical point of view - since, as I said above, from a
theoretical point of view a wide range of analyses of (1-1) can be argued
to be valid) to analyze strings like Jean lent Mary or Jean lent. . . book or
lent Mary books as a predicate. And that is when there is a variable
present in the clause in the "missing" role-player slot. The item that
binds that variable could be considered the single role player, and the
clause with the variable could be considered a predicate clause. I will call
such clauses "open," and I will return to a brief discussion of them in
section 2.6 below and in chapter 5, section 5.
We will here proceed, then (laying aside until later the discussion of
open-clause predicates), with this very simple first formulation of the
notion of predicate as an event word which takes one or more role
players. With this formulation we can rule out closed clauses (clauses
without variables) from the class of potential predicates: closed clauses
are not just events, but events plus all their role players. Thus closed
clauses correspond to propositions. With this formulation we can also
rule out anything but the phrasal level as a level for role players that are
nominal (but we will see in sec. 1.4 below and in ch. 2, sec. 14 that we may
have to allow nonphrasal role players that are non-nominal). This is
because if a role player is referential, the entire reference (not just the
sense) of an item tells us who or what the role player is. But N" is the
referential level. For example, in an N" like the dangerous dog, the head
N tells us only the sense of the nominal, but all the elements (the,
dangerous, and dog) contribute to helping us pick out the referent. Thus
N" is the referential level of nominals. Therefore N" can be a role player,
but NorN' cannot.
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An event-structure approach to predicates 9
In (1-1) the boldface predicate is an action; in (1-2) it is a state.
(1-2) The man who marries young is happy.
In (1-2) happy alone, not is happy, is the predicate. I follow Emonds
(1985) in calling the copula here a grammatical word. Is is present in (1-2)
purely to satisfy needs of the syntax and does not contribute to the
semantic interpretation of the sentence in the same way semantically full
lexical items do. (One of the functions of is in (1-2) is to carry the tense of
the sentence, for example.) Notice that the same semantic relationship of
predication holds between the man who marries young and happy in (1-
3), without any copula, as in (1-2) above, with the copula. (Examples of
the first type in (1-3) were pointed out to me in this regard by Andrew
Radford (personal communication).)
(1-3) Happy the man who marries young!
I consider happy the man who marries young.
The fact that the predication between the man who marries young and
happy in (1-2) and (1-3) is the same is evidence that the copula in (1-2) is
not part of the predicate, but a grammatical word only.
Predicates, whether of the action or state type, can take as few as one
role player, as in (1-2) above for states and (1-4) below for actions:
(1-4) Jean ran.
And predicates can take more than one role player, as in (1-1) above for
actions and (1-5) below for states:
(1-5) Jean is talented at the piano.
In (1-5) the role players are Jean and the piano. The predicate is talented,
which lexically selects the preposition at to introduce one of its role
players (see sec. 2.1 below for discussion).
The preceding first glance at predicates is quite distinct from most
linguistic definitions today, in which typically the subject role player is
singled out and the rest of the material is the predicate. I will argue in
section 2.6 below against any analysis of predication in terms of VP (verb
phrase) versus the syntactic subject. But the argumentation will depend
upon an understanding of lexical argument structure; thus it must be
postponed until after the relevant discussion. I will return to this issue
from another perspective in chapter 2, section 3.
One immediate advantage of the event-structure definition of predi-
cate developed in this chapter is that such a definition can carry over to
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10 Theta assignment
languages which lack a VP (the so-called nonconfigurational languages,
such as Tagalog - as argued in Miller (1988)).
1.1 Modifiers and specifiers as part of the predicate
The sentences used to exemplify predications above, with the exception
of that in (1-3), consist of a single clause with predicates that consist of a
single word, all the remaining words of the sentence being phrases that
function as role players in the event. The sentences of natural language,
however, do not always lend themselves to such a neat analysis.
(1-6) Jean almost lent Mary books.
(1-7) Jean lent Mary books frequently.
In (1-6) and (1-7) the words almost and frequently call for analysis. They
are not role players in any event. We might, then, ask if they are
themselves events, i.e. predicates. That is, are (1-6) and (1-7) best
analyzed as representations of a proposition in which there is a predicate
roughly paraphrased as "almost happened" and "frequently happened"
with a propositional role player roughly paraphrased as "Jean lent Mary
books"?
Certainly scholars have argued that adverbials are predicates (see
Davidson 1975, Rothstein 1983, Abney 1986, among others), where I use
the term "adverbial" to cover the functional notion of modifier of a non-
nominal. Thus the analysis of adverbials as predicates is not a strawman,
and such an analysis has significant effects on the semantic representation
of sentences. For example, (1-8) would be analyzed as having three
predicates (each in boldface here):
(1-8) Jean almost lent Mary books frequently.
And the different readings of whether it was a frequent occurrence that
Jean almost lent Mary books or (the more bizarre reading) that it was
almost the case that Jean frequently lent Mary books could be represen-
ted by having either frequently or almost as the highest (i.e., least
embedded) predicate. That is, at LF (Logical Form) the arrangement of
predicates would encode scope relations.
An analysis with adverbials as predicates, however, would meet
resistance in a theory that requires role players to be phrasal. For
example, in (1-6) the putative predicate almost would take a single role
player (the whole sentence minus almost) that does not form even a
constituent, much less a phrasal level of one. Most theories of predication
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An event-structure approach to predicates 11
that I know of require role players to be phrasal - thus one might balk at
giving up this requirement on role players easily. Still, the requirement
that role players be phrasal is as stipulative as any other claim about role
players, at least so far as non-nominal role players are concerned. (Recall
that it was argued above that nominal role players must be N", since N" is
the referential projection.) And we will see in various places in this book
(including ch. 2, sec. 14) that non-nominal role players may well not be
phrasal. We must therefore consider this objection in that light. And if
this were the only objection to a predicate analysis of adverbials, and if
such an analysis seemed otherwise to be the most nearly adequate one, I
would be led to propose that these adverbials offer one more piece of
evidence against the requirement that all role players be phrasal.
However, this is not, in my opinion, the most nearly adequate analysis of
adverbials.
There are alternative analyses of (1-6) and (1-7) that lead to simpler
semantic representations of sentences like (1-8). One is the analysis
linguists traditionally have given such sentences, in which almost and
frequently are taken to modify other parts of the sentence rather than to
predicate of them. This analysis, of course, assumes a distinction between
"modification" and "predication," a distinction that I return to and
defend in section 1.4 below. With this kind of analysis the varying
interpretations of (1-8) would be handled as scope phenomena.
An alternative midway between the two above is to call an adverb like
frequently a predicate but an adverb like almost a modifier (where the
term "adverb" is a category label, although these adverbs are adverbial
in function, as well). The relevant distinction here would be that (1-6)
does not entail (1-1), but (1-7) does. (See Davidson 1970, Clark 1970,
Thomson 1977 for a discussion of the entailment of sentences like (1-1)
from sentences like (1-7).)
None of these analyses seems quite right to me, although the last one
discussed above seems less obviously incorrect than the others. Consider
almost in (1-6). Rather than being an event in itself in any obvious way, it
acts as a degree word, telling us that some independent event
(independent of the concept of "almost") did not occur but came very
close to occurring. As a degree word it is similar in function to the
italicized words in:
(1-9) Sally is very tall.
(1-10) Sally is so smart.
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12 Theta assignment
(1-11) That is quite a possibility.
(1-12) She's a little bit nice.
And like these degree words, almost modulates an event by placing it
somewhere on the scale from negative to positive with respect to the
occurrence or extent of the event; almost is an intrinsic part of which
event actually occurs. I therefore analyze the predicate in (1-6) as
consisting of the two words (which do not form a syntactic constituent)
almost lent. In other words, I take almost to be a modifier which combines
with an event word to form a new event, and, thus, a new predicate.
Let me point out that if I were to accept almost as a predicate, I can see
no clear reason for not also analyzing the italicized words in (1-9) through
(1-12) as predicates. But then the notion of predicate would get ever
more distant from the event structure notion I develop in this section (in
which predicate is an event word or words that takes at least one role
player). Thus, while a more abstract approach to the concept of predicate
might well allow an analysis of almost as a predicate, I will here stick to a
limited sense of predicate that excludes degree words from qualifying for
predicate status.
Given that I am analyzing some adverbials (the degree adverbials) as
parts of predicates, I will generalize and analyze all adverbials that are not
themselves role players (and see McConnell-Ginet 1980, who argues that
some manner adverbials are role players (in our terms) with certain
predicates, as well as sees. 1.6, 2.4, and 3 below) as parts of predicates.
That is, my predication theory will not distinguish between types of
adverbials unless such distinctions are required for explanatory or
theoretical adequacy. And, so far as I can see, such distinctions are not
required. Therefore, even adverbials such as frequently in (1-7) will be
analyzed here as parts of predicates. In sum, modifiers of an event word
are parts of the predicate that the event word is part of.
Let me point out that my adopted position that manner adverbials like
frequently are part of the predicate, rather than predicates themselves, is
not a strong one. It is quite possible that adverbials do, in fact, split into
two groups, where some form part of the predicate and others are
separate predicates which predicate of the predicate (or, perhaps, of the
entire proposition minus the adverbial). That is, I recognize that
frequently might best be analyzed as an event unto itself. In fact, as I point
out below with respect to (1-34), there are uses in which even degree
adverbs seem much more open to an analysis as predicates than almost
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does in (1-6). Still, throughout this study I will continue to analyze
adverbials that are not role players as part of the predicate they co-occur
with for ease of exposition. The theory to be developed here, however,
does not hang on this choice of analysis. In fact, no claim in this book is
based solely on the analysis of adverbials as parts of predicates. Thus, if
one were to analyze adverbials as predicates themselves, the theory of
predication given in this work would hold unchanged.
Like adverbial modifiers, I contend, are the auxiliaries. That is, the
auxiliaries, by giving the information of aspect, modality, and voice, are
an intrinsic part of the event and should be analyzed as part of the
predicate (and see Napoli 1981 for a discussion of the semantic contribu-
tion of an auxiliary to the predicate).
One important result of the analysis of adverbial modifiers and aux-
iliaries as part of the predicate is that we will not be able to recognize
predicates in the lexicon. (But, as mentioned above, this result will follow
also from other data. These data are given in sees. 1.2 and 2.4 below.)
Instead, we need to see which words go together in a sentence before we
can pick out the predicate. This fact means that we must make a
distinction between lexical items and predicates and between the seman-
tic relationship between a lexical item and its arguments as opposed to the
semantic relationship between a predicate and its role players. We will
turn to this distinction in section 1.6 below.
At this point, we can alter our working definition of predicate to be an
event word plus or minus modifiers and auxiliaries, taking one or more
role players.
Finally, up to this point in this subsection the predicates whose
auxiliaries and modifiers we have discussed have been verbs. We will see
repeatedly in this chapter (particularly in sec. 2 below) that we can have
predicates that do not contain verbs (and we already have seen an
example of one in (1-3) above). I propose to generalize the findings of
this subsection to all categories that can be predicates. Thus not only
auxiliaries, which are specifiers of V , but specifiers of any category can
be part of a predicate (though they need not be - as in the case where a
specifier of N' is a role player of a predicative N - see sec. 2.3 below). And
not only adverbials (which I have defined as modifiers of non-nominals),
but modifiers of any category can be part of a predicate. In the examples
below, the predicates are in bold face.
(1-13) I am very fond of Sue.
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(1-14) She is a terrific scholar of Dante.
(1-15) She's absolutely into Greek art.
In section 1.6 I argue that all role players of a predicate are arguments
of a theta assigner that is (part of) the predicate. The theta assigner turns
out to be the event lexical item of the predicate. For the moment let us
assume this. We can now define the concept "head of a predicate," which
will be useful to us in later discussion:
(1-16) Head of a predicate: The lexical item which assigns a theta role to the
role players of a predicate containing that lexical item is the head of that
predicate.
To see what this definition means, consider:
(1-17) Jean lent Mary the books in great haste.
In (1-17) the predicate consists of the discontinuous string lent . . . in
great haste (that is, an event word plus an adverbial). There are two
lexical heads which are parts of this predicate: lent and haste. But of them
only lent assigns a theta role to the role players of the predicate, so lent is
the head of the predicate.
In (1-16) "containing" is not to be read as properly containing. Thus
the word lent in (1-1), for example, is a part of the predicate and is, in
fact, the entire predicate. Here lent heads the predicate that it is (part of).
1.2 Nonconstituent predicates
In (1-6) the continuous string almost lent is a predicate, although it does
not form a syntactic constituent. Thus analyzing modifiers and specifiers
as part of the predicate requires that I admit predicates which do not form
syntactic constituents. We would hope that other factors besides the
analysis of modifiers and specifiers would lead us to the conclusion that
predicates do not have to form syntactic constituents, for, if not, our
analysis of modifiers and specifiers as potentially being part of the
predicate could be seen as too expensive to the grammar.
In fact, there is strong evidence independent of the analysis of modi-
fiers and specifiers that predicates need not form syntactic constituents.
Consider predicates consisting of fixed or idiomatic sayings. Such sayings
need not form syntactic constituents, as in:
(1-18) Mary took the students to task.
Mary took the students on an outing.
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Both took. . . to task and took. . . on an outing are predicates and neither
forms syntactic constituents or even continuous strings (and see Emonds
1976 and Larson 1987 for more such examples). There are many such
idiomatic predicates, a great number of which involve a verb plus a
preposition, as in look after in the sense of "take care of." The approach
to predication developed here can analyze these strings as predicates
without calling for any kind of syntactic restructuring of a V plus a P into a
new constituent (compare Hornstein and Weinberg 1981, for example,
and see the refutation of this kind of syntactic restructuring in ch. 2,
sec. 3).
Of course, a predicate certainly can be a syntactic constituent, as with
an idiomatic P(repositional) P(hrase) (hereafter PP) and V(erb) P(hrase)
(hereafter VP):
(l-19)a. Bill is out of his mind.
b. Bill lost his cool.
Here the entire PP out of his mind and the entire VP lost his cool are the
predicates. (And see Maling (1982) for discussion of idiomatic PPs).
Example (1-19) can be used to point out another important fact: not all
predicates need have a head that is a single word, in the sense of (1-16)
above. In (l-19)a, for example, both out and mind are lexical heads that
are part of the predicate, but neither of them is an event word in this
usage, thus neither of them is a theta assigner here. This predicate, then,
is a phrasal lexical item. I will argue in section 1.6 that the whole phrase is
a theta assigner. Therefore the whole phrase is the head of the predicate
(as well as filling the entire predicate).
At this point one of the most important results of this chapter is
apparent: predicates are semantic primitives which are not definable
either as lexical units (and see sec. 1.1 above) or as syntactic units. Thus
the concept of predicate, which is best defined by considering the
semantic concepts of events and role players, must be admitted into the
grammar of natural language.
1.3 Predication versus unanalyzable idioms, identification, and
nonpredicative verbs
So far we have examined single-clause sentences in which it is clear that a
single event occurs and that event has at least one role player. Here I ask
the question of whether every clause must have a predicate.
The answer is clearly no. Several types of clauses do not involve
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16 Theta assignment
predication. The sentences in (1-20), for example, cannot be analyzed as
consisting of an event plus role players in that event.
(1-20) Mum's the word.
The jig's up.
These are semantically unanalyzable idioms (in the sense of Napoli
1987a), and the entire clause forms a single semantic unit that cannot be
broken down into semantic subparts (although, of course, these sen-
tences are syntactically analyzable).
In fact, it has been claimed in the literature that many types of clauses
do not involve predicates in the sense I am developing here, such as
sentences expressing weather and time. That is, some claim that these
expressions involve actions or states, but fail to have role players. In
Napoli 1987a I argue that weather and time expressions in English
(although this is not so in many other languages) are, after all, examples
of predication structures, and do, in fact, involve role players. For
example, weather it can control PRO, as in It got cold enough [PRO to
snow], where event control (as in Lasnik 1984 and Williams 1985) is not
possible: the event of getting cold does not snow. Thus if only arguments
can control PRO (as in Chomsky 1981), then weather it is an argument
and "weather words" are predicates. (See Napoli 1987a for further
arguments for the thematic status of weather and time it.)
There are other kinds of clauses which have been argued not to involve
predication, such as purely identificational sentences of the type seen in
(1-21). (See Williams 1983b, among others, where the linguistic tradition
is quite distinct from that found in the more philosophical literature.)
(1-21) My aunt is Miss Prothero.
Actually, the determination of whether a sentence like (1-21) is an
identificational sentence or a predicational sentence is highly dependent
upon context. With a sentence of the form NP!-copula-NP2 (where NP =
Noun Phrase) the likelihood of NP2's being understood as a predicate
correlates inversely with the likelihood of NP2's being understood as a
totally referential NP. Thus if we are offering two different names for the
same person, (1-21) is an equational or identificational sentence and has
no predicate and no role player. In that situation, the sentence should be
symmetrical. That is, if we reversed the order of the NPs, we still would
be giving the same information. But in another context NP2 could be
understood to be assigning a semantic role to NPj; it can be telling us that
NP! has the property described by NP2. Such a context is found in:
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(1-22) We all know that a woman named Miss Prothero asked the firemen if
they wanted anything to read. But what you haven't figured out yet is
that my own aunt, our dear friend, is Miss Prothero.
Here Miss Prothero is a predicate taking my own aunt as its role player.
While English does not morphologically signal the difference in seman-
tic function between the NP Miss Prothero in (1-21) and in (1-22), other
languages may. John My hill (personal communication) has pointed out
to me that (1-21) would be rendered differently from (1-22) in
Indonesian, where the predicative status of the relevant NP in (1-22)
would be clearly marked. The linguist studying predication in English is
nowhere near so lucky, however, and must rely primarily on context for
recognizing instances of predication in copular sentences.
Still, there are other clues that help us distinguish between predication
and identification. As Rothstein (1983, p. 104) points out, in general the
more evaluative material there is in the NP to the right of the copula, the
more likely we are to interpret that NP as predicative. (See also Strawson
1950, Wiggins 1970, Donnellan 1966, Geach 1950,1968, Halliday 1967a
and b, Fodor 1970, Hawkins 1978, Higgins 1979, Williams 1980,
Woisetschlaeger 1983, and Safir 1985 (pp. 169-70) for a discussion of
definite NPs as predicates.) Many have noted that superlative NPs can be
predicates, whereas usually a definite specifier closes an NP so that it
cannot be a predicate - see Higginbotham 1985. (For other ways in which
superlatives behave like indefinite NPs, see Rando and Napoli 1978 and
the references given there.)
Higgins (1979) offers tests for predicate nominals, such as whether or
not they can be questioned with what (the operator binding a predicate
NP position) rather than who (the operator binding a referential
[+human] NP position). (See also Williams 1983b, who makes use of this
question test.) By that test the NP to the right of the copula in (1-21) is not
a predicate. Thus (1-21) is not an appropriate response to (1-23):
(1-23) What is your aunt?
But the NP to the right of the copula in (1-24) is a predicate, as we can see
by the fact that (1-24) can be an appropriate response to (1-23).
(1-24) My aunt is a doctor.
Nominals that function as identifications also have a distinct distribu-
tion from nominal predicates, as noted by Stuurman (1985, p. 242) and
Napoli (1987a). (But see Jackendoff 1983, who argues that identification
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and predication are essentially the same in conceptual structure - and see
my remarks on coindexing in identificational sentences in ch. 2, sec. 2, as
well as the NPs analyzed in ch. 5, sec. 1.)
Still another candidate for a clause that does not contain a predicate is a
clause with the main verbs seem, happen, begin, continue, and other so-
called aspectual verbs (see Newmeyer 1975, and Napoli and Rando 1979,
ch. 1), as in:
(1-25) It happens now and then that cats can't meow.
(1-26) Jack began [t to cry].
When these verbs take an infinitival complement, I analyze them in the
standard GB way as involving NP movement. The "t" in (1-26), then, is
the trace of the moved NPJack. The question is whether these verbs head
predicates.
Given the semantic definition of predicate developed thus far, we are
led to conclude that these verbs are not predicates. Instead, like almost
(see sec. 1.1 above) and the auxiliaries, these verbs give information in
such a way that they are intrinsic parts of some event but do not denote
events in themselves. Thus happens in (1-25) forms a predicate with the
discontinuous string now and then . . . can't meow. And began in (1-26)
forms a predicate with to cry. Likewise, the modal verbs and aspectual
verbs of Italian (which are main verbs syntactically; see Napoli 1974b)
would not be predicates in themselves, but parts of predicates (as in
Napoli 1981, who draws syntactic as well as semantic parallels between
these verbs and the auxiliaries avere ('have') and essere ('be') in Italian).
One might object to this analysis on two different grounds. First, these
verbs can impose semantic restrictions on their clausal sisters, as we can
see by the conflict in time frames in (1-27):
(1-27) The water continued [t to spill in an instant].
A clausal complement of continue must be a durative proposition. If only
predicates could impose semantic restrictions on other items they co-
occur with, then (1-27) could be taken as evidence that continue is a
predicate.
My response has two parts. For one thing, I know of no arguments that
only predicates can impose semantic restrictions on the items they co-
occur with. In fact, I will argue in section 2.4 that role players can select
each other for pragmatic and semantic appropriateness (see the discus-
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sion of (1-85)); thus items other than predicates can impose semantic
restrictions on their linguistic companions.
For another thing, if continue is part of the predicate in (1-27) we have
an immediate explanation for the failure of (1-27): the predicate continue
. . . to spill in an instant is self-contradictory (containing both a durative
and a point-time requirement) and, thus, anomalous. Therefore, the
analysis with continue as part of the predicate accounts for the failure of
(1-27) in at least as adequate a way as an analysis with continue as a
predicate.
The other major objection that one might bring against my claim that
all these verbs are not predicates themselves is based on the behavior of
seem. Seem can take a referential nominal in a to phrase in addition to a
clause, similarly to predicates such as ridiculous:
(1-28) Jack seems to me [t to understand French pretty well].
That he would even think of firing you is ridiculous to me.
One might claim that the NP in the to phrase is a role player of seem in the
first sentence of (1-28). However, the referent of this NP is not a
participant in any event of seeming alone. Instead, the entire event of
seeming to understand is viewed from the perspective of the referent of
this NP. That is, the judgment that Jack has the property of seeming to
understand is anchored on this NP. Thus this NP is attracted into the
sphere of role players of the entire predicate. (I will return to a discussion
of what this means for the Projection Principle in sec. 4 below.)
I maintain, then, that seem, appear, happen, and the aspectual verbs
are all parts of predicates but not predicates themselves. This analysis of
seem is counter to that of most linguists, who claim seem is a predicate (a
notable exception being Rothstein (1983), who analyzes seem as a copula
and not as either a predicate or part of a predicate).
I conclude that not every clause need contain a predicate, unanalyzable
idioms, identificational clauses, and clauses with verbs such as seem and
continue supplying clear cases of clauses without predicates.
1.4 Multiple predication in a single clause
In all the examples we have seen thus far, the predicate we have singled
out has been the only predicate in the sentence and the sentence has
consisted of only one clause. It is a highly debated matter as to whether it
is possible to have more than one predicate in a single clause. In chapter
2, section 1 I lay out some of the theoretical consequences of allowing
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multiple predicates in a single clause, and I compare Chomsky 1981 to
Williams 1980, among others. In this book, however, I will not debate this
issue. In Napoli 1987a I come down firmly on the side of Williams: there
may be multiple predicates in a single clause. And let me point out that
even Chomsky (1986b) has abandoned his original position. I therefore
here merely assume that there may be multiple predicates in a single
clause.
Along with this assumption goes the desire to adhere strictly to the
principle that only syntactic data are valid evidence for syntactic struc-
ture. (See also the introduction to this book.) Thus the fact that we have
the sense of a proposition does not in any way offer evidence that we have
the syntactic structure of a clause. The sentence in (1-29), then, is
analyzed as consisting of only a single clause, but has two predicates:
painted and red. (That is, I reject a small clause analysis of such sentences;
see Williams 1983a.)
(1-29) We painted the barn red.
An interesting question arises here: whether there is a distinction to be
made between predication and modification. Certainly (1-29) above
contrasts with (1-30) below, in which red is typically called a modifier of
the head N barn.
(1-30) We painted the red barn.
In (1-29) we are painting the barn and the result is that it turns out red.
Thus the barn is a role player (the only role player) with respect to the
state described by red. In other words, red predicates of the barn.
However, in (1-30) (to be read without contrastive stress on red) we are
picking out a particular barn by calling it red. Yet after painting it might
be another color, as in:
(1-31) We painted the red barn blue for a change.
And before painting it might not have been red, but perhaps we painted it
red so it now is. We can even read (1-30) with the red barn as the name of
the barn (in which case, perhaps we should capitalize: The Red Barn), to
indicate the barn that used to be red or that for some reason or other we
refer to as "the red barn." But even if the barn is a red barn before we
begin and even if we wind up repainting the barn red again, the red in (1-
30) does not tell us that the barn was painted red. Instead, the red in (1-
30) assigns the property to the barn of being that barn that we call red,
regardless of our reason for calling it red. We are not asserting in (1-30)
that the barn has the property of redness, unlike in (1-29).
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In both (1-29) and (1-30) red assigns a property to the barn, then, and
thus is a theta assigner (and see sec. 4 below). The distinction is whether
the redness is being asserted of or being used as a characterization of the
barn. One might be led then to propose that in both uses red is a
predicate, where modification would be a type of predication.
However, there are at least two related reasons for distinguishing the
property assignment called modification above from the property assign-
ment called predication. One is that if red in (1-30) were a predicate, then
its role player would be barn, which is an N and not an NP, whereas
nominal role players should be phrasal, as already has been argued at the
opening of this chapter. That is, NP is the referring level. Thus it makes
no sense to speak of an N as being a role player with the notion of role
player and predicate that I am developing in this chapter.
Second, the modifier red in (1-30) falls within the maximal projection
(that is, within the N") of the N it modifies, so that it is an intrinsic part of
defining the reference of the entire NP. In contrast, the reference of the
NP predicated of by red in (1-29) is independent of the property of
redness. This is a major distinction between modification and predica-
tion, and one the theory must recognize.
I therefore will treat modification as a separate phenomenon from
predication. And I will account for the fact that red in (1-30) assigns a
property to barn by saying that red here assigns (or discharges) a theta
role to barn by way of Theta Identification (see Higginbotham 1985). (I
return briefly to the issue of theta identification in sec. 4 below.)
In sum, while the difference between (1-29) and (1-30) is one of
difference between what is asserted and what is not asserted, it is also a
difference between what is predicated and what is not predicated. My
argument that modification should not be identified with predication is in
no way dependent upon the fact that redness is asserted of the barn in (1-
29) but not in (1-30). In fact, as John My hill (personal communication)
has pointed out to me, if we put the stress peak of the sentence on red in
(1-30), we can read redness as being asserted of the barn. Thus there is no
definitive correlation between nonassertiveness and modification.
Still, the fact that red is asserted in (1-29) is worthy of note, since in
general asserted information is significant new information, so it can be
the focus of a clause and can be understood as a predicate. (See Myhill
1984 for an overview of notions such as assertion, focus, transitivity,
semantic complexity, and foregrounding, as well as Chomsky 1972,
Erteshik 1973 (who discusses the notion of communicative dynamism of
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Firbas 1962), Hopper 1979, and Hopper and Thompson 1980, among
others.) In fact, Myhill (1985) demonstrates that in many languages
focussed or new information is grammatically marked, sometimes with
what could be called the predicate marker. And in English some have
argued that the intonation peak marks the focus (see Akmajian 1970,
Chomsky 1972, and Higgins 1979, among others). For example, consider
sentences such as those below, suggested to me by John Myhill (personal
communication).
(1-32) BILL left town.
(1-33) Some IDIOT must have suggested that to you.
(The capitals indicate that the stress peak falls on this word.) We can
analyze (1-32) with Bill as a predicate, assigning the property of being
Bill to the one who left town. We can analyze (1-33) with idiot (perhaps
plus the auxiliary must) as a predicate, assigning the property of (obliga-
tory) idiocy to the one who suggested that to you. In fact, we might even
allow degree words to be analyzed as predicates when they receive the
stress peak {contra the discussion in sec. 1.1 above):
(1-34) I know SOME Spanish.
Here some would be a predicate, assigning the property of smallness to
the amount of Spanish I know. (And see Bolinger 1972 (pp. 75ff.) for a
discussion of predicate degree nouns.)
Of course, if the indicated words above are, indeed, predicates, then
we have evidence that non-nominal role players need not be phrasal. And
from here on in this book I will assume that non-nominal role players
need not be phrasal (see also ch. 6, sec. 7).
If the discussion immediately above of (1—32)—(1—34) is on the right
track, we can see that approaches to predication based on syntactic
restrictions between the locations of predicates and certain of their role
players are hopelessly inadequate. One of my goals in this book is to show
precisely that. And while I will be primarily concerned with less con-
troversial instances of predication, the ones discussed here are telling and
offer a serious challenge to syntactically based theories of predication.
Let me repeat that one of the most important consequences of my
nonsyntactic definition of predicate is that we must allow a grammar in
which semantic units do not have to be represented by syntactic units and
syntactic units do not have to be mapped into semantic units. This is
precisely the point defended on different grounds in Keenan and Faltz
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge. rg/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511519963.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 15:42:54, subject to the Cambridge Core
An event-structure approach to predicates 23
1978. That is, there is no isomorphism between syntax and semantics.
(See also Williams 1982.)
1.5 Role players are necessary
Many event words, particularly nominals, can be used without any
explicit role players present, as in:
(1-35) I'm saddened by destruction of any kind.
Here destruction is an event word, and in other sentences it can take
explicit role players:
(1-36) I'm saddened by the Venetians' destruction of their own city.
The question posed here is whether an event word must have a role player
in order to be (the head of) a predicate.
Certainly our discussion of the notion of predicate thus far has repeated
continually that a predicate takes one or more role players. And notice
that both formal linguistic and philosophical approaches to predication
take the stance that a predicate must be an open function which assigns a
theta role to (or saturates) some role player (see Higginbotham 1985 and
Davidson 1975, among others). Therefore, let us not abandon the idea
that a predicate requires a role player unless we are forced to do so.
The problem now is how to analyze destruction in (1-35). If destruction
indeed has no role players in (1-35), then it cannot be a predicate, and we
must analyze it as a second nonpredicative use of an event lexical item
(where modification is the first we have seen). While the concept of event
lexical items having a variety of separate functions does not seem to me to
be wrong in any a priori sense, it does seem wrong to analyze destruction
in (1-35) drastically differently from destruction in (1-36), given the very
strong semantic similarity between the two sentences. Fortunately, we
may be able to analyze destruction as a predicate in both sentences. There
is evidence that while destruction in (1-35) has no explicit role player, it
does have an implicit one. That is, an implicit role player would be one
that appears in the argument structure of an event lexical item in the
lexicon, but is not realized as any syntactic entity (although it may be
realized as a morpheme - see Roeper 1987). (The significance of implicit
arguments for the Projection Principle will be discussed in sec. 4 below.)
Thus in (1-37) the infinitival rationale clause requires an agentive
controller (see Roeper 1987), which is the implicit role player of
destruction.
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge. rg/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511519963.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 15:42:54, subject to the Cambridge Core
24 Theta assignment
(1-37) The destruction of the city [PRO to prove a point] was deplorable.
One cannot argue that a PRO in specifier of NP is the controller here,
since adverbial NPs also can fill this specifier:
(1-38) Yesterday's destruction of the city [PRO to prove a point] was
deplorable.
I conclude that an implicit agentive role player of destruction is present in
(1-35) and it is this implicit role player that controls the PRO of the
rationale clause in (1-37) and (1-38). (See Manzini 1983, Williams 1985,
and Roeper 1987 for relevant discussion; see also Torrego 1986, who
reports on an MIT talk in 1986 by Alessandra Giorgi and Giuseppe
Longobardi, in which they give Italian sentences parallel to (1-37).)
Once more we have an instance of predication for which any syntacti-
cally based theory of predication is inadequate. The agentive role player
of destruction in (1-35) not only does not stand in any specified syntactic
location with respect to that predicate, it is not even a syntactic entity
(although it is a thematic entity).
A similar case is that of impersonal passives (passives of intransitive
verbs) in languages such as German, where there is evidence that an
implicit agent is present (perhaps even in the passive morpheme on the
verb, as proposed in Roeper 1987 for personal passives). The most
common types of evidence involve adverbials or AdjP's that can appear
in these impersonal passives and that can be licensed only by an agent (see
also Hale and Keyser 1986 and 1987, Belletti 1986, and Safir 1987a).
There is at least one other type of serious challenge to the definition of
predicate as requiring a role player, and that is nonreferential uses of
NPs. For example, consider:
(1-39) A career girl, which is something my fiancee doesn't happen to be,
attracts me most.
(Example (1-39) is from Higgins 1979, p. 253.) Here the NP a career girl
has a "genus" sense (see Givon 1978, p. 293) rather than a referential
sense. Example (1-39) minus the relative clause could be roughly
paraphrased as, "The type of female that attracts me most is a career
girl." In other words, the semantic representation of a nonreferential NP
like a career girl should be something like "someone who is a career girl"
(or that x, such that CAREER GIRL(X)). With this kind of semantic
representation, the nonreferential NP is a predicate and has a role player:
that referent which the NP picks out by virtue of its being used predi-
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catively. But now we are talking about nonlinguistic entities that have no
linguistic counterparts, and if we were to require our theory of predica-
tion to handle the analysis of these NPs, we might have to develop a
theory that goes beyond linguistics proper. (And see Chierchia 1985 for a
discussion of a range of other difficult problems in this area.)
I will not use NPs like a career girl in (1-39) as examples of a predication
in any of the rest of this book, since their analysis raises questions I am
unable to answer (and some I am unable to even formulate). Let me just
point out that no theory of predication that I will be arguing against in
chapter 2 can deal any better with this use of an NP than mine.
I will, therefore, set this type of NP aside, and assume that it does not
pose a threat to my claim that every predicate requires at least one role
player, a claim common to all theories of predication so far as I know, as I
said above.
I conclude that in all instances of predication a predicate must find at
least one role player.
1.6 Semantic roles and thematic roles
It is a commonplace in the linguistic literature that some lexical items
have "argument" structures and assign "thematic" or "theta" roles to
their arguments. That is, linguists of various recent theories seem to agree
that some lexical items involve the notion of event and call for a range of
participants or role players (which are typically dubbed "arguments") in
that event. (Exactly at what point in the grammar theta assignment takes
place and exactly how argument structure is best represented are much
discussed matters. See Stowell 1981, Williams 1984b, and Culicover and
Wilkins 1986.) Actually, there is evidence that arguments of an event
lexical item can be introduced when that event lexical item appears in a
syntactic structure by way of nonlexical principles which allow adjuncts of
a lexical head to be interpreted as arguments of that lexical head (see in
particular Jackendoff 1987a and b). We will discuss such cases in sees. 2.4
and 4 below.
In this book I do not justify the existence of or investigate deeply the
event structure of particular lexical items (although I do discuss nominals
and prepositions in sees. 2.3 and 2.4 below in this regard). Much
interesting work on this topic is found in Gruber (1965), Jackendoff
(1972, 1983, and 1987b), Stowell (1981), Anderson (1983), Pustejovsky
(1985), Beth Levin (1985), Croft (1986), Guerssel et al. (1986), Talmy
(1986), Roeper (1987), and various works issuing from the Lexicon
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Project at MIT (including Guerssel 1986, Hale and Keyser 1986 and 1987,
Rappaport, Levin, and Laughren 1987), among others. What is essential
to my present work is that some lexical items do have event structures,
and those that do have arguments (the counterparts to role players for
predicates).
Let me point out that in spite of the fact that for the most part event
structure is dependent upon meaning, to some extent the particular event
structure a lexical item may have is lexically idiosyncratic. That is, words
which are close synonyms may have different event structures and
subcategorization frames. Try, for example, need not take a theme
argument, but attempt must (She tries hard vs.* She attempts hard).
Some have argued that all obligatorily subcategorized sisters to a
lexical head at DS are arguments of that lexical head. (By "DS" I mean
to indicate the first syntactic tree in the derivation.) McGonnell-Ginet
(1982), in fact, proposes that all VP internal adverbs are arguments. On
the other hand, Dowty (1980) has argued that all "oblique" terms
(beneficiaries, locatives, instrumentals, etc.) are not arguments of V. In
section 1.1 above I argued that some adverbials and specifiers are not role
players of a predicate but, rather, parts of the predicate (although I
pointed out that an analysis of certain adverbials as predicates themselves
might be justifiable, and we will see in sec. 2.3 below that specifiers of NP
can be arguments of the N). For much the same reasons as outlined there,
I would argue that these same adverbials are not arguments of a lexical
head (contra McConnell-Ginet). On the other hand, since beneficiaries
of the type found in Indirect Object position are role players in an event, I
would argue that they are arguments of a lexical head (contra Dowty).
And I argue in section 2.4 below that certain instrumental and locative
phrases are arguments of a lexical head (see also sec. 3 below). There-
fore, at least some adverbials can be arguments with certain lexical items.
As I said above, the traditional approach is to say that lexical heads
assign theta roles to their arguments. For example, Vs can take an agent
argument and/or a theme argument and/or an experiencer argument and/
or a beneficiary argument, etc. Exactly how many and which theta roles
exist is something to be established by argumentation based on examina-
tion of the data from individual languages. The crucial point for us here
and throughout this book is that theta roles exist - not which theta roles
exist.
Lexical items which have argument structures, then, are potential
heads of predicates. However, a predicate can consist of more than just a
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lexical item that is an event word (see sees. 1.1 and 1.2 above for
predicates that consist of more than one word), and a predicate need not
contain any isolable event word at all, but instead may be a phrasal event
(as in the case of metaphorical or idiomatic PP and VP predicates, such as
in (1-19) above). Still, regardless of a predicate's lexical and syntactic
make-up, all predicates take role players and assign properties to those
role players.
In this subsection I want to compare the concepts of assignment of a
property to role players by a predicate and assignment of theta roles to
arguments by lexical heads, for, certainly, there is much in common
between the two.
Marantz (1984) uses the term "semantic role" to describe the role a
lexical head assigns to its arguments and the role a VP assigns to its
syntactic subject when the syntactic subject is an argument of the V. (In
sec. 2.6 below I argue against VP as a theta assigner, contra Marantz and
others.) He points out that semantic roles in his sense are numerous and
idiosyncratic, varying according to the lexical item, whereas theta roles
are simply features of the more varied semantic roles. Thus, for example,
both eat and assassinate take an agentive argument, but they assign quite
different semantic roles to that agentive argument. (The agent of assas-
sinate acts maliciously, with aforethought, and with purpose (see
Chomsky 1972). The agent of eat merely initiates the action, but may
even do so unintentionally (as in the situation in which a two-year-old boy
eats his chewing gum by accident).)
I here modify Marantz's term of semantic role and apply it to predica-
tion: I say that a predicate assigns a semantic role to its role players.
Notice first that the semantic roles a predicate assigns to its role players
depend on the entire predicate and not just on the head of the predicate.
(Recall that the head of the predicate is the theta assigner for the role
players, as in (1-16) above, while the entire predicate includes certain
specifiers and modifiers of the head as well.)
(1-40) Jack barely passed the test.
Jack almost passed the test.
In (1-40), where the predicate is barely passed, Jack passed the test; in (1-
41), where the predicate is almost passed, he did not. Jack, therefore, is
assigned a different property by the different predicates (the property of
barely passing in (1-40); the property of almost passing in (1-41)). Hence
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the presence of barely and almost affects the semantic role assigned to the
role players of the predicates in these sentences.
On the other hand, in both (1-40) and (1-41) Jack is agentive. That is,
the theta role of Jack is affected only by the lexical head that Jack is an
argument of (which is the verb passed in both sentences), not by the full
predicate that Jack is a role player of.
One might object to my claim that adverbials do not affect theta roles,
by pointing out much-discussed pairs such as:
(1-42) Sharon broke the window accidentally (when she fell through it).
(1-43) Sharon broke the window on purpose.
In (1-43) Sharon is agentive. But in (1-42) Sharon is not agentive (but
perhaps experiencer or instrument, according to the situation). We
consider the adverbials accidentally and on purpose when figuring out
what theta role Sharon has in these sentences. However, this does not
mean that the adverbials are DETERMINING or assigning the theta role.
Instead, the sentence without any adverbials is vague with respect to the
theta role of Sharon:
(1-44) Sharon broke the window.
Broke is an appropriate word to use to describe a range of events, both
intentional and unintentional, from the point of view of the person who
initiates the action. Part of the lexical structure of this verb is the
information that it can be used in such a range of events. We therefore
must use context (sometimes linguistic context, sometimes pragmatic
context) to figure out which theta role the relevant argument of the verb
has in a given utterance (and see Hale and Keyser's 1986 discussion of
"constructional" theta roles).
Many lexical heads have a fairly wide range of events that they can be
used to describe and are thus vague out of context with respect to the
theta role of some of their arguments. Other lexical heads are highly
restrictive as to what kinds of events they can be used to describe. Thus
assassinate, for example, must take an agentive argument in its active
form; but kill need not (as in The poison killed John, where the poison is
an instrumental, not an agent).
The above discussion points out a flaw in any theta theory that insists
that a given lexical item has a fixed set of theta roles to assign to its
arguments (and see Jackendoff 1987a for other problems with such a
theory). However, the above discussion does not require us to make theta
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assignment be dependent on context. Instead, we can assume that theta-
role assignment applies at DS without regard to context. Then at LF we
will check theta-role assignment against context to test for appropriate-
ness. In this way we will be adopting an evaluation procedure similar to
that proposed in Farmer (1984) for Japanese particles.
I conclude that theta roles are determined by lexical items and not by
predicates. If we consider headed predicates, this amounts to saying that
theta roles are determined by the heads of predicates rather than by the
full predicates. In this way theta roles contrast sharply with semantic
roles, which are determined by predicates (including the head and all the
other parts).
If we take a strict and narrow definition of theta role as that role
assigned by a lexical head to its arguments, we will reach the conclusion
that in a sentence like,
(1-45) That comment is off the wall.
the NP that comment has no theta role since it is not an argument of any
lexical head, although it does receive a semantic role from the PP
predicate off the wall. I believe such an approach would miss the
generalisation that metaphorical PPs like off the wall can take role players
which appear to have the same kinds of theta roles that role players of
nonphrasal predicates have. I therefore propose that individual words
with event structures take arguments, and, furthermore, that any phrasal
lexical item that has an event structure takes arguments. The PP off the
wall is a phrase in the lexicon (that is, it appears in the lexicon as a single
lexical item in its nonliteral sense) and it has an event structure. Thus it
will take an argument and assign a theta role to that argument (probably
the same theta role the adjective crazy assigns to its argument).
We can now see that there is a correlation between arguments of lexical
items (including phrases as well as single words) and role players of
predicates. I sum up this correlation in the following principle:
(1-46) Principle of Coincidence: The arguments of a lexical item are the role
players of the predicate headed by that lexical item.
In sum, lexical items - whether single words or phrases - that have
event structures take arguments and assign theta roles to their arguments.
If such lexical items are single words, they can be the heads of predicates.
If such lexical items are strings of words but are not phrasal in the lexicon
(such as take. . . to task), their syntactic head (that is, the X that heads the
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minimal XP that contains the entire lexical item - so in take. . .to task the
syntactic head is the verb take, since the VP is the minimal XP that
contains take . . . to task) can be the head of a predicate. If such lexical
items are phrasal (such as off her rocker), they are headed predicates
(since the whole phrase is the theta assigner). (Notice that all through
here we are talking about the potential to head a predicate, since we have
seen that event words need not head predicates in the sense developed
here, as when they are used as modifiers.)
Theta roles are limited in number and are merely gross semantic
features indicating the general nature of the participation of an argument
in an event.
Predicates (consisting of a head and perhaps other parts), on the other
hand, assign semantic roles to their role players. These semantic roles are
unlimited in number and are finely detailed semantic properties, indicat-
ing the specific nature of the participation of a role player in the event.
We can sum up the findings of this section in the following chart:
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
lexical item = single word,
strings of words, or phrase
Lexical items take arguments.
Arguments receive theta roles
(which are a few gross semantic
features like agent, patient,
theme . . .).
PREDICATE STRUCTURE
predicate = an event
lexical item (the head of the
predicate) plus certain
specifiers and modifiers of
the head
Predicates take role players.
(All arguments of the head of
the predicate are its role
players.)
Role players receive semantic
roles (which are unlimited,
detailed semantic properties).
2 Categories that can be predicates
A(djectives), V(erbs), and N(ouns) all can serve as the heads of predi-
cates. I will demonstrate this fact below rather briefly, since much of the
material to be covered is not controversial in any way. An exception is the
very controversial question of whether N can take a role player in
specifier position - to which I answer yes. From that, it follows that an N
such as destruction can head a predicate.
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In the discussion that follows I will call an item an "argument" or a
"role player" interchangeably, since arguments of the heads of predi-
cates are always role players of the predicate (see the Principle of
Coincidence in (1-46) above). This does not mean that the distinction
pointed out between the two in section 1.6 is no longer recognized, but
only that that distinction is not relevant to the following discussion.
P(repositions) also can serve as the heads of predicates, but I will argue
that in many instances P is not a predicate, but a relational word of a
different sort from event lexical items. In particular, in most uses Ps are
not the sole theta assigners of other items.
Finally, I will argue that all phrasal categories other than projections of
C(omplementizer) can be predicates, but only if they are fixed or
idiomatic phrases or if they are headed predicates which just happen to
fill the entire maximal projection of the head of the predicate. I argue
specifically against the proposal of many that VP (including DO (direct
object) and IO (indirect object) arguments) rather than V plus adverbials
and auxiliaries is a predicate. Regarding projections of C, I argue in
section 2.6 that closed clauses cannot be predicates (where the only open
clause is one that contains a variable).
2.1 The lexical head A(djective)
An adjective is always an event word. That is because adjectives denote
states (whether stative or active). Accordingly, adjectives always dis-
charge (or assign) theta roles and very often head predicates (see section
1.4 above, where I argue that modification is distinct from predication).
The role players for a predicate headed by A can appear inside the
A(djective) P(hrase) or outside the AP. Examples of role players which
are inside the AP are given in (1-47), where the relevant role player is
italicized and the predicate is in boldface:
(l-47)a. Bill is [AP fond of Jan].
b. This fraction is [AP equal to .875].
c. Ken is [AP generous to the less talented of us].
Notice that I have italicized NPs without italicizing the P that introduces
each italicized NP in (1-47). In English A does not take NP sisters (see
Maling 1982 for relevant discussion). Instead, NP arguments of the
lexical head A which appear inside the AP are introduced by preposi-
tions. Those prepositions are either the so-called null preposition of (and
see M. Anderson 1979, Bouchard 1982, and Chomsky 1986b), as in
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(l-47)a; or some preposition lexically chosen by the head A, like the to in
(l-47)b (something must be "equal to" something else and never "equal
at" or "equal on", etc.); or the typical preposition which introduces IOs,
like the to in (l-47)c (which is also lexically chosen by the head to the
extent of the choice between to and for: a gift for NP, but a remark to NP;
give NP to NP, but bake NP for NP; etc.). (Notice that while a lexical
head chooses to ox for to introduce its beneficiary argument, this does not
mean that these Ps are contentless. To the contrary, they carry distinct
meaning; see Larson 1987.) Sometimes the head A allows a small range of
Ps rather than just one. For example, generous can introduce a benefi-
ciary argument either with the IO preposition to or with toward or with (as
in generous {toward/with} the less talented of us but not * generous {ofI on)
the less talented of us).
While the italicized arguments in (1-47) are not syntactic sisters to the
head A, they appear in PP sisters to the head A, where the P is chosen by
the head A (either lexically selected, or merely chosen by the category A
- as in the case of the null preposition of). In a sense, then, they are
"prepositional sisters" to the head A, and I will lump them together with
real syntactic sisters, ignoring the configurational effect of the P introduc-
ing these arguments.
Of course, not all sisters to A are role players of the A. In (1-48) I have
italicized sisters to A that are adverbial, here functioning to tell the extent
or degree of the quality denoted by the A.
(1-48) Debbie was upset beyond belief.
Joan is beautiful to the extreme.
In accordance with the discussion in section 1.1 above, I analyze these
modifying phrases as parts of the predicate. Thus the predicates in (1-48)
are upset beyond belief 'and beautiful to the extreme. When a PP sister to an
A is part of the predicate rather than a phrase containing a role player of
the predicate, we find that the P can range lexically, without being chosen
by the head A {upset beyond belief, upset to a small degree, upset in
ridiculous ways). Likewise in a phrase like generous {forI around) the less
talented of us we do not have an argument of the head A, but, rather, an
adverbial PP which is part of the whole predicate (in contrast to (l-47)c).
Another position inside AP where we might expect to find arguments
of the lexical head A is specifier position. However, A does not allow
arguments in specifier position. Thus if an NP occurs in specifier of A,
it is a measure or degree phrase and should be analyzed as part of
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the predicate (see sec. 1.1 above). In (1-49) the italicized NPs are
in specifier position to the A and form part of the predicate headed by
that A.
(1—49) Your remark was several hours too late to help.
Margene's a little bit happy now.
Every A takes precisely one argument outside the AP, whether the A
heads a predicate or a modifier. (We will return to the significance of this
fact in sec. 4 below.) Examples of role players which are outside the AP
include NPs in GF subject position (such as Bill, this fraction, and Ken in
(1-47) above), as well as NPs in other syntactic relationships to the AP (as
discussed in ch. 2), such as the italicized NPs below (where the relevant
predicate is in boldface). (By "GF" I mean "grammatical function" as
defined in Chomsky 1981.)
(1-50) I consider Sally [AP fond of Jan].
With Sally [AP fond of Jan], you might as well forget about a fair vote in
the class treasurer election.
2.2 The lexical head V(erb)
V, unlike A, need not be an event word. We already saw in (1-2) above
that the copula be can be used as a grammatical word and not as a part of a
predicate (although, as we will see in (1-105) of sec. 2.6 below, the copula
can head a predicate in some uses). And I argued in section 1.3 above that
so-called aspectual verbs like seem and continue form parts of predicates
but are not predicates themselves. Thus not all Vs head predicates.
However, V usually heads a predicate.
V, like A, can take sister arguments, typically introduced without a P,
but sometimes with the null preposition of, sometimes with a P lexically
chosen by the V, and sometimes with the IO prepositions to and for. (As
with A, I have lumped together prepositional sister arguments of V with
real syntactic sister arguments of V for ease of exposition.)
(l-51)a. The girl [Vp read her cousin a book].
b. The girl [Vp thought of nothing in particular].
c. The girl [Vp depended on her cousin].
d. The girl [Vp read to her cousin].
(Thought, as in (l-51)b, takes only a PP or clausal argument in most uses,
although in casual speech we hear phrases of limited productivity like She
thinks computers day in and day out.)
V, like A, can take sisters that are not arguments, but that are instead
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part of the predicate the V heads (that is, V can take sisters that are
modifiers):
(1-52) She's laughing now.
Artisans sleep in that park.
And V, like A, cannot take an argument in specifier position (where I
am adopting an X-bar theory that is a restrictive version of that in
Chomsky 1986a - thus the GF subject slot is not the specifier of V and S
(the node I have been calling I) is not a projection of V - see the
introduction to this book). In fact, V does not allow any kind of NP in
specifier position.
Finally, V, like A, must take precisely one argument which appears
outside the VP that the V heads. In (1-51) that argument is the girl.
Again, the importance of this fact is discussed in section 4 below.
2.3 The lexical head N(oun)
Many nouns are not event words and do not have argument structures;
thus they cannot head a predicate. Mona Anderson (1983), in fact, argues
that no concrete nouns have argument structures. I differ with her, as will
be seen below, but I agree that most concrete nouns in most contexts do
not denote events and do not have argument structures. For example, the
noun wallet can take an NP in specifier position as well as an NP sister, but
in both instances that NP is not a role player with respect to the head N:
(l-53)a. I prefer yesterday's wallet.
b. Sue bought a wallet of leather.
c. A wallet of true beauty lay on the bureau.
In fact, Mona Anderson (1983, p. 17) calls the of'xn (l-53)b & c the
"attributive of" and says that its object modifies the head N. Thus the of
phrase here is part of the object. And I would analyze the NP in specifier
position in (l-53)a as part of the object, as well.
Abstract nouns, however, are often event words and, like A and V,
they can take NP sisters (with the null P of, or prepositions lexically
chosen by the head N, or the IO prepositions to and for) as arguments.
Thus these Ns can head predicates. Below only the head of the predicate
is in boldface:
(l-54)a. the death of John
the destruction of the city
the bounce of the ball
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b. an unhealthy dependence on celery juice
the story about the firewoman
c. a passing remark to the professor
the gift for the landlady
And, as with A and V, the sisters of N need not be arguments of the N,
even if the N is an event word. Instead, they can modify the N - and would
then be part of the predicate that the N heads:
(1-55) destruction of incredible magnitude
a remark beyond the bounds of decency
a look of anxiety
Thus far in this section, the items I have identified as arguments of the
head A, V, or N are generally accepted in the literature to be precisely
that. Now I turn to the much more controversial question of whether NPs
in specifier position of N are arguments.
Of course, the question arises seriously only for Ns which have an event
structure. Thus in (1-56) Sharon is not an argument of the head N, since
this N in this context takes no arguments.
(1-56) Sharon's wallet is embossed with pink letters.
In fact, the relationship of Sharon to the wallet is underdetermined: she
could own it, have made it, want to buy it, like it very much, have lost it,
drew it, etc. That is, the wallet in (1-56) is characterized by having a
relationship to Sharon, but the sentence does not tell us the nature of this
relationship. Instead, our ability to imagine contexts is the only clue we
have to this relationship when the sentence is used out of context (see
Williams 1982 and Higginbotham 1985, among others).
Notice that the situation here is quite distinct from the situation
discussed in section 1.6 above regarding (l-42)-( 1-44), where I discussed
lexical items which can be used to describe a small range of types of events
and thus can assign a correspondingly small range of theta roles to their
arguments. So while Sharon in (1-56) may have an enormous range of
possible appropriate relationships to wallet out of context, Sharon in (1-
44), repeated here:
(1-44) Sharon broke the window.
may not have an enormous range of possible appropriate relationships to
broke, but, rather, only a few. That is, Sharon does receive a theta role in
(1-44), from the lexical head broke, but out of context we will not be able
to determine precisely which of the small set of possible theta roles this
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NP might have it actually does have. But Sharon does not receive a theta
role at all in (1-56).
However, when the head N takes arguments, the question of whether
an NP in specifier position can be an argument of the head N arises
seriously, as in:
(1-57) The Huns' destruction of the city upset us.
Chomsky (1970) analyzed the NP the Huns' in specifier position of
destruction in (1-57) as the subject of this head N, and he has maintained
that position ever since (as in Chomsky 1986a). And Cinque (1980) has
argued for Italian that possessive adjectives, which appear in specifier
position of NP, are subjects of NP (but see Ruwet 1972, who points out
for French that possessive adjectives have the favored interpretation of
possessor over all other possible interpretations, including agent).
Williams (1982), on the other hand, argues that no NP in specifier
position of an N is an argument of the N. His reasons are multiple and I
will not counter them here. Instead, whenever an argument I am making
is relevant to one of Williams' arguments, I will point that out. (See in
particular the discussions of (1-58) and of (1-72) through (1-76) below
and several points in ch. 2, particularly sees. 3 and 10.) Here let me
address just one of his positions. Williams claims that the semantic
relationship of the genitive NP to the head N in an NP like that in (1-57) is
underdetermined. But Mona Anderson (1983) shows that this relation-
ship is, instead, narrowly defined, in contrast to the relationship between
a genitive NP in specifier position and a concrete head N. And Hornstein
and Lightfoot (1987) show a variety of ways in which Williams' account of
the semantic interpretation of determiners in NPs like that in (1-57) is
inadequate.
Notice that this issue is crucial to a theory of predication. For those who
require that a predicate take an argument external to the maximal
projection of the head of the predicate (as Williams does), destruction in
(1-57) does not head a predicate. But with my definition of predicate,
there is nothing to prevent our analyzing destruction in (1-57) as a
predicate.
I here follow Chomsky in allowing an NP in specifier position of an
event N to be an argument of that head N. In chapter 6, section 2,1 argue
that anaphors in both Italian and English require that their antecedents
bear a theta role. Assuming for the moment that I am correct on this
point, let me add here that specifiers of N can bind an anaphor in both
Italian and English.
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(1-58) la sua4 finta lettera a se stessOj
'his fake letter to himself
il suOj libro su se stessOj
'his book about himself
(The Italian examples in (1-58) are from Giorgi 1987.) Thus from (1-58)
we are led to the conclusion that specifiers of NP can be arguments of the
head N.
Before proceeding to a discussion of specifiers of NP, I would like to
address Higginbotham's (1985) argument against analyzing specifiers as
arguments, an objection based on examples such as (l-59)a.
(l-59)a. John's dog
b. John is a dog.
Higginbotham asks, if John can bear a theta role, why cannot we
understand the NP in (l-59)a to mean that John is a dog, parallel to (1-
59)b? Higginbotham concludes that NPs in specifier position do not enter
into the subject-predicate relationship.
I do not have an answer to Higginbotham's question. However, I
would like to argue against a commonly proposed explanation of the lack
of a predicational reading in (l-59)a. Some have used the i-within-i
constraint to block the missing predicational reading of (l-59)a (see
Williams 1982, Hornstein 1984, among others). The i-within-i constraint
blocks a phrasal node from being coindexed with another phrasal node
that properly contains it. I argue in chapter 2, section 10, that this
constraint is incoherent. However, here it is necessary only to show that
the i-within-i constraint cannot help us to rule out the missing predica-
tional reading of (l-59)a.
To see this, let us add indices to (l-59)a. The noun dog will be
coindexed with the overall NP, since heads and maximal projections are
coindexed (see Williams 1981b). Then, under a predicational reading,
the noun dog and the NP John would be coindexed by predication
coindexing (which will be the topic of chapter 2, and see Williams 1980).
The result is:
(1-60) NPj
NPj N'
I I
John's Nj
dog
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The fact that both NPs in (1-60) have the same index would constitute a
violation of the i-within-i constraint.
One problem with this explanation of the lack of a predicational
reading for (l-59)a is that the same indexing configuration is found in (1-
61), where we understand John to have the same semantic role as in
(1-62).
(1-61) John's nastiness
NR N'
I I
John's N;
i
nastiness
(1-62) John is nasty.
A proponent of the i-within-i constraint explanation for the failure of a
predicational reading in (l-59)a might point out that the NP Johns dog in
(1-60) would have the same referent as the NPJohn under the (ungram-
matical) predicational reading, but the NP John's nastiness in (1-61)
would not have the same referent as the NP John. Thus if we were to
construe the i-within-i constraint as pertaining only to referential indices
(that is, if the i-within-i constraint is a constraint against semantic
incoherence, as Williams 1982 presents it to be), then (1-60) would be a
violation of the i-within-i constraint but (1-61) would not.
However, there are at least two problems with this account. First, given
this account, we would expect both (l-63)a and (l-63)b to be bad on the
reading indicated by the indices. But, instead, the second sentence is
good, as is the third (suggested to me by Andrew Radford (personal
communication)).
(l-63)a. *Johnj is [hisj boss]j.
b. Johnj is [his own; boss]j.
c. Anyone can see that John; is [hisj father's son]j.
Hornstein (1984) discusses sentences like (l-63)a as examples of the
i-within-i constraint. And he says sentences like (l-63)b and (l-63)c
show that the constraint is not a semantic one.
Second, there is empirical evidence that the i-within-i constraint
explanation for (l-59)a is wrong. In Italian we find NPs like (l-64)a,
which has the structure in (l-64)b (see ch. 3, sec. 2 for justification of this
syntactic structure):
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(l-64)a.
b.
quel
that
kthat
Spec
quel
matto di
madman
madman
NPj
Ni
matto
Giorgio
of Giorgio
Giorgio'
N'
P NPj
1 1
di Giorgio
I argue in chapter 3 that the head N matto is a predicate here, taking
Giorgio as its sole argument. The indices for (l-64)b reflect this analysis.
Here whether or not we consider predication indices, we have a violation
of the i-within-i constraint. That is, the two NPs with identical indices
should constitute a violation of the i-within-i constraint just as much as
the coindexed NPs in (1-60) are said to. Yet (1-64) is perfectly grammati-
cal with the reading indicated. Thus the i-within-i constraint does not
block (1-64) and should not be assumed to block (1-60), either. (In ch. 41
analyze English NPs which have a similar syntactic and semantic analysis
to the Italian one in (1-64). And I point out in chapter three that a variety
of languages have such NPs. Thus (1-64) cannot be considered some
aberration of Italian alone.)
I conclude that the failure of (l-59)a to have a reading similar to that of
(l-59)b is irrelevant to the question of whether an NP in specifier position
can bear a theta role. And I leave open the question of why (l-59)a lacks
a predicational reading.
From this point on I will proceed with the assumption that NPs in the
specifier position of Ns that have argument structures can be arguments
of those Ns. This is a major difference between N and both A and V. And
this difference correlates with another major difference, which is that N
does not require any arguments to be external to the NP (as in (1-57) and
(1-64)), whereas both A and V require precisely one external argument. I
will return to these contrasts in section 4 below. Notice that in allowing an
argument to appear in specifier position, N is parallel to Chomsky's
(1986a) nonlexical category I(nflection).
However, as with NP sisters to N, NPs in specifier position of a head N
need not be arguments of that N even when the N is one that does have an
argument structure or when the N clearly is being used predicatively.
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(l-65)a. yesterday's announcement
b. Leila is Elena's doctor.
In (l-65)a yesterday is not an argument of announcement', in (l-65)b,
Elena is not an argument of doctor (in fact, Elena's relationship to the
doctor is as underdetermined as the relationship of the specifier to the
head N in other concrete NPs, such as Sharon's wallet).
There are at least two more interesting facts about event nouns that
relate to their argument structure. First, sometimes theme or patient
arguments (the so-called objective arguments) that occur as sister argu-
ments to head Ns can also occur in the specifier position:
(1-66) the city's destruction (cf. the destruction of the city)
Chomsky (1970) proposes that such arguments are generated in sister
position and moved to specifier position. I follow Chomsky here (and, in
doing so, I am joined by many, including Mona Anderson 1983, Kayne
1984, Aoun etal. 1987, Roeper 1987, and Hornstein and Lightfoot 1987;
but against this position see Williams 1982, Higginbotham 1983, Rappa-
port 1983, Grimshaw 1986, Zubizarreta 1986, and Safir 1987a).
The movement rule operative in (1-66) is not limited to just arguments,
but can apply to certain adverbial NPs, as Emonds (1976) points out and
as we saw above in (l-65)a, which is derived as in (1-67):
(1-67) the announcement yesterday —> yesterday's announcement
The application of NP movement in (1-67) is of special interest in light of
the claim commonly found in the literature that arguments and non-
arguments of a lexical head bear different syntactic relationships to that
head. In particular, some claim that there is a syntactic difference
between arguments and non-arguments to the effect of placing arguments
of a lexical head H as sisters to the head and non-arguments as sisters to
H' (or, sometimes, even H"). We can see this approach in Jackendoff
(1977, 1983), Emonds (1985), and its history is recounted by Speas
(1986), who also adopts it (but inconsistently, I believe - see p. 81 versus
p. 120). Chomsky (1981, 1982, 1986a, 1986b), however, has never
adopted this approach.
As I stated in the introduction to this book, I consider only syntactic
data (and not semantic data) as valid evidence for syntactic structure. I
know of no convincing syntactic evidence that our X-bar theory need be
any more complicated than that first proposed by Chomsky in 1970 and
revised in 1986a. Thus for the lexical categories of N, V, A, and P, I take
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X" to expand to specifier and X'; and I take X' to expand to X and its
phrasal sisters (see more detailed discussion of this in the introduction to
this book). Therefore in this chapter (and throughout this work) I have
consistently analyzed as sisters to the head all phrases to the right of a
lexical head within the phrase. In my analysis, then, the NP movement in
(1-67) is the same NP movement that applies in (1-66): movement from
sister position of N to specifier position of N. Indeed, the fact that NP
movement applies equally to arguments and non-arguments suggests
these two semantic functions are indistinguishable syntactically - just as
my analysis would demand they be.
The second very interesting fact about the argument structure of event
nouns is that arguments of the head N which are not objective are not
limited to specifier position, but can also occur as sisters to the head N,
always introduced by the null preposition of. (For arguments that the
object of passive by is not the agentive argument, see ch. 2, sec. 8).
(l-68)a. John's {lecture/story} amazed me.
b. That {lecture/story} of John's amazed me.
(l-69)a. John's {death/arrival} shocked me.
b. The {death/arrival} of John shocked me.
There is an interesting variation in (l-68)-(l-69) above: some of the
sister NPs to the head N have a genitive marker (as in (l-68)b) and some
do not (as in (l-69)b). We find that when an N has only one argument in
its lexical structure, that argument has no genitive marker in sister
position (the death of John, the happiness of your little sister). But when an
N allows two or more arguments, if one of these arguments is nonpreposi-
tional and nonobjective, it appears with a genitive marker. (And see
Aoun et al. 1987 for an explanation of why the objective reading cannot
emerge with the genitive, based on a violation of the E(mpty) C(ategory)
P(rinciple) of Chomsky 1981 in logical form.) This is true whether or not
any other arguments are syntactically realized (the lecture of John's (on
birth control), the belief of Sam's (in intergalactic communication)). But if
all the arguments are prepositional or objective, none of them is in the
genitive (the betrothal of Judith to Pete). We can see that if the N takes
more than one argument, then the argument typically singled out as the
subject in G(overnment) and B(inding) literature is marked with a
genitive when it appears as the sister to the head N. (We return to this fact
in sec. 4 below.)
Notice that John('s) in the (b) examples of (l-68)-(l-69) is the
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so-called subject argument of the NP; I am taking John(ys) to be a sister to
the head N in these instances. Even linguists who allow a less restrictive
version of X-bar theory than the one I adopt in this book should agree
that John('s) is attached at the sister level in (l-68)b and (l-69)b. This is
because, as Speas (1986) has shown, if we trace the method of argumen-
tation often used to advance an X-bar theory in which the X' level can
have sisters (other than conjuncts or the specifier) and in which perhaps
even the X" level can have sisters (other than conjuncts), we find that an
overriding principle is that if a theta relationship holds between X and Y,
then X and Y are sisters (see Speas 1986, especially p. 81). Thus John('s)
should be a sister to the head N in (l-68)b and (l-69)b even in theories
which allow sisters to N' and N".
Cinque (1980) argues that so-called subject arguments of N in Italian
are not sisters to N but to N'. However, his argument is based on the claim
that the clitic ne, when it corresponds to an argument of an N, cor-
responds only to the subject argument of N. This claim is not accurate, as
I show in chapter 3 (see the discussion following (3-97)). Therefore, I
maintain that the proper analysis of (l-68)b and (l-69)b has John('s) in
sister position to the head N. (In chs. 3 and 4 I will give several tests for
constituency within NP. By all of these tests John('s) is a sister to the head
N in (l-68)b and (l-69)b, as the reader can easily confirm.)
In light of the fact that there are good arguments for an NP movement
rule that takes a sister of N and places it in specifier position of N (the rule
operative in (1-66) and (1-67)), I propose that that same rule is operative
in (1-68) and (1-69) and derives the (a) sentences from the (b) sentences.
That is, I propose that all arguments of N within NP are sisters of N at DS
and that a movement rule can place an argument of N in specifier position
ofN.
Notice that if we generated all arguments of N that appear within NP as
sisters (introduced by of) of the head N, the fact that the theta role
interpretations of the genitive NPs in specifier position (1-68) a and (1-
69)a is the same as that of the genitive NPs that are sisters to the head N in
(l-68)b and (l-69)b is accounted for.
Also, we will see in chapter 6, sections 4 and 5.3, that the specifier of
NP behaves in the same way sister arguments of N behave with respect to
the binding of anaphors. (That is, specifiers behave as though they are
within the theta domain of the head N - where the notion of theta domain
is defined in ch. 2, sec. 5.) The behavior of specifiers examined in chapter
6, then, would be accounted for with the analysis which generates these
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specifiers as sisters to N and optionally moves them into specifier
position.
Furthermore, as long as we see the advantage of relating the two
positions by a movement rule, we should prefer movement from sister
position into specifier position rather than vice versa so that the trace will
be properly bound.
There is at least one more reason for generating all arguments of N that
appear within NP as sisters to N in DS. And that is that if we do so, theta
assignment by Ns in Italian observes the same principles that we find for
theta assignment by Ns in English (assuming that the subjects of N
studied in Cinque 1980 are really sisters to N - see ch. 3). Since this whole
book presents a theory of predication that holds for both Italian and
English (and that I offer for all configurational languages), and since that
theory of predication depends upon theta theory in important ways (as we
will see in ch. 2), we should opt for a version of theta theory that will
suffice for both languages.
I will hereafter assume the derivation of NPs in specifier position of N
as originating in sister position.
If the above analysis of (l-68)a and (l-69)a as coming from (l-68)b
and (l-69)b is correct, we would expect this rule to operate on NP sisters
of any N, not just on sisters of Ns that have event structures. In fact, it
appears that the rule does operate inside all NPs, regardless of whether or
not the head N has an event structure:
(1-70) John's car
that car of John's
yesterday's menu
the menu (of) yesterday
(But see Torrego 1986, who argues that possessives that follow the head
N are sisters to N".) There are, however, restrictions on this movement
rule, since not all NP sisters can undergo it (an idea of great merit, but not
*a great merit's idea). Those restrictions, however, while puzzling, are
tangential to our study, and I will not go into them here.
Let us turn now to a question raised at the opening of section 2 which I
said that I would not delve into deeply: how do we know whether a lexical
item has an event structure? The question is not acute for A (which
always has an event structure), nor for V (which almost always does), but
it is critical for N.
At the opening of section 2 I gave a list of references the reader can
consult which deal extensively with this very question. Here I want to
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focus only on one particular related question: whether or not concrete Ns
can serve as heads of predicates.
I believe that there is at least one usage in which any N, whether
concrete or not, can head a predicate. That context is seen here in (1-71),
and we have already come across it in (l-65)b above:
(1-71) This ratty piece of leather is a wallet.
No one could consider this ratty piece of leather a wallet.
In both sentences of (1-71) the concrete N wallet is used in its predicative
rather than referential sense (and see sees. 1.3 and 1.5 above for a
discussion of nonreferential uses of NPs). Thus the property of being a
wallet is assigned by the phrase a walletto the NP this ratty piece of leather.
In fact, it is by virtue of appearing in a predicative position that the N
wallet must head a predicate and take a role player.
There is at least one other instance in which I would analyze a concrete
N as a predicate. Certain concrete Ns appear to have argument struc-
tures. Consider
(1-72) Mary's photograph
Photograph is a concrete N and (1-72) can be used in a wide range of
situations, including those in which Mary took or liked or bought or did
any other number of actions with respect to the photograph, as well as
those in which Mary was in the photograph. In other words, the
relationship of Mary to photograph at first appears to be under-
determined, just as the relationship of a genitive NP to other concrete Ns
is (as in (1-56) above).
However, if Mary's appears in sister position, the theme sense is
unavailable:
(1-73) that photograph of Mary's
And photograph can take a nongenitive NP sister that it bears a specific
semantic relationship toward:
(1-74) that photograph of Sue
In (1-74) Sue must be in the photograph, thus Sue is a theme argument of
photograph.
Not all concrete Ns can take theme arguments. The fact that the
concrete N photograph can stems from the fact that a photograph is
always of something - it is inherently transitive. Like photograph are
portrait (a portrait of our family), record (a record of the war), story (a
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story of love), and many other concrete Ns (including the so-called
"picture" nouns, as in Gruber 1967).
When a concrete N has a theme argument present, it will assign the
agentive role to a genitive argument. Thus in (1-75) Mary can be
understood only as performing some action with respect to photograph
and not as being in the photograph.
(1-75) Mary's photograph of Sue
that photograph of Mary's of Sue
Notice that Mary does not have the same semantic role in (1-75) as it has
in the corresponding clause with the verb photograph:
(1-76) Mary photographed Sue.
In (1-76) Mary was the photographer, but in (1-75) Mary may have
performed a range of actions with respect to the photograph. That is, the
event denoted by the verb photograph is specific in terms of the particular
semantic roles assigned to the role players in that event; but we see no
such specificity of the agentive role player with the noun photograph. It
seems that concrete Ns like photograph do not really denote events, but,
instead, evoke events - and the range of events they can evoke is limited
by the referent they denote. Since a photograph can be taken, or bought,
or enjoyed, etc., the genitive in (1-75) could bear any of these semantic
roles.
Given the remarks above, I conclude that concrete Ns like photograph
evoke events and have argument structures. As such, they can head
predicates.
Looking back at the interpretations of (1-72), then, I would analyze the
thematic sense of Mary's as being the result of NP movement from sister
position of N of a theme argument (as in (1-66)) and the agentive sense of
Mary's as being the result of NP movement from sister position of N of an
agentive argument (as in (1-68) and (1-69) above).
In sum, N may or may not head a predicate, unlike nonmodificational
uses of A and unlike most uses of most verbs. And N need not have an
argument which appears outside the NP that the N heads, unlike both A
and V. We will return to the importance of this last fact in section 4.
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2.4 The lexical head P(reposition)
Most have claimed that all lexical heads are theta assigners (following
Chomsky 1981), and paid little attention to Ps in particular. Some have
considered the potential to be a theta-role assigner to be identical to
valency, so that all inherently relational words (words with valency
greater than zero) will be theta assigners (as in Croft 1986). Since Ps are
generally relational, with a valency approach to theta assignment, we
would expect Ps to assign theta roles.
Both of these approaches are inadequate for Ps. I argue here that in
some uses P is a theta assigner, but in many others it is not. Thus only in
those uses in which P is a theta assigner can P head a predicate.
In this section I discuss only a handful of Ps. My discussion is meant to
be representative of the kinds of questions that arise when looking at the
semantic structure of strings involving Ps and of the types of analyses I
would offer. (The reader interested in discussions of a wide range of Ps
might consult Jackendoff 1983, 1987a, 1987b.)
The lexical head P can be an event word and can take arguments. Thus
P can head a predicate in examples such as those in (1-77). (This type of
example was pointed out to me by Barry Miller (personal
communication).)
(1-77) Pina is into Greek pottery.
Her sister is after my husband.
Those children are on drugs.
I'm onto you.
The sentences in (1-77) are decidedly conversational in style. It is
possible that some of these uses of Ps originated as ellipses from longer
phrases such as chase after, dependent on, catch on, where the V or A
head got lost. In fact, these PPs, like certain fixed-phrase PPs, such as at
ease, and metaphorical PPs, such as off his rocker, can undergo AP
movement, whereas regular PPs cannot.
(1-78) f Happy 1
j Into art Y though he says he is, he isn't really,
but: l*Inbed J
Thus the syntactic behavior of these PPs is like that of APs in some
respects.
There are also many uses of P in which P is clearly not an event word
and does not assign a theta role to any arguments. We have seen many of
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these above, such as uses of the null preposition of, or Ps lexically selected
by some other lexical head, or the IO prepositions to and for:
(1-79) I'm fond of pasta.
You shouldn't rely on translations.
Jim baked the carrot cake for Sally.
Here pasta is an argument of fond, not of, translations is an argument of
rely, not on; Sally is an argument of baked, not for. We can say that the
prepositions in (1-79) transmit the theta role from the actual theta
assigner to the argument.
The distinction between the usage of the Ps in (1-77) and those in
(1-79) is easy to see, and I expect no reader to balk at my analysis of the Ps
in (1-77) as heading predicates, but the Ps in (1-79) as not heading
predicates. However, in many other instances the functional status of Ps
is not so uncontroversial.
There are instances in which a P interacts with a V to affect which event
a sentence describes. In (1—80)—(1—81) we find a much-studied pair (see
Jespersen 1924, Fillmore 1968, S. Anderson 1971 & 1977, B. Levin and
Rappaport 1986, and Jackendoff 1987b).
(1-80) Jack sprayed the wall with paint.
(1-81) Jack sprayed paint on the wall.
In (1-80) we understand the wall to have been painted by way of being
sprayed. Paint here is the theme which covers the patient, the wall. But in
(1-81) we understand Jack to be doing something to the paint and we
understand the wall to be only the locus of the event. The question now is
how the object of with receives the theme role in (1-80).
Let me first point out that sprayed with is not a theta assigner, for, if it
were, it would be a lexical item in (1-80). But then we would be missing a
generalization, since with can appear with a theme sense for its object
with a variety of other verbs (as in We loaded the wagon with hay and
other such examples). Furthermore, another close semantic use of with
has an instrumental sense for its object, and again this occurs with a
variety of other verbs:
(l-82)a. Mary broke the piggy bank with a hammer.
b. Mary opened the door with a key.
c. Mary paid for the necklace with my dime.
Thus it seems to be either with alone or sprayed alone that is responsible
for the instrumental sense of the object of the P.
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The question now is exactly what the semantic status of with is in (1-80)
and (1-82). One might posit that with is a predicate, taking its object and
the entire proposition of the clause minus the with phrase as its role
players, or, alternatively, its object and the predicate of the clause it
appears in as its role players. There is at least one good reason to reject
this analysis. Notice that the presence of the with phrase affects the
appropriateness of the role players of the predicate of the clause.
Consider an example with instrumental with:
(l-83)a. People/ants/amoebas eat honey.
b. People eat honey with a spoon.
c. #Ants/amoebas eat honey with a spoon.
(The symbol # in (l-83)c means semantically or pragmatically ill-
formed.) Here the addition of with a spoon limits the appropriate
agentive role players for the predicate eat. However, typically a predicate
selects its own role players but does not select the role players inside its
own role players. That is, some principle of integrity forces each predi-
cate to treat its role players as semantically unanalyzable wholes, at least
with respect to certain kinds of semantic information. If with (or even
with a spoon) were a predicate in (1-83), it could select its own role
players, but it should not look down inside those role players; thus it
should not participate in the selection of the role players of eat. The
semantic selection that goes on between the syntactic subject of the
sentence in (l-83)b and c, then, and the adverbial with a spoon, is
evidence that with a spoon is a role player in the same event that the
syntactic subject is a role player in: the event of eating. That is, the
presence of one role player often affects the appropriateness of the choice
of other role players of the same predicate:
(1-84) Mary resembles Pete.
Certain kinds of anemia resemble diabetes.
(1-85) #Mary resembles diabetes.
In some respects with is a marker (or perhaps a reflex) of the fact that its
object is used as a theme or instrument in the event denoted by the
predicate of the clause with occurs in. It is, then, parallel to the use of
special Cases in other languages to mark instrumentals (such as ablative
in Latin). I therefore analyze the entire with phrase as an argument (an
unsubcategorized-for argument) of the verb in (1-80) and (1-82).
Let me point out that Hale and Keyser (1987) argue that with is
inherently instrumental. They also develop the ideas of central event and
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central participant. In (l-82)a, for example, the central event is breaking
and the central participant is the piggy bank. Mary is less central in that
she causes the central event and the hammer is less central in that it is the
tool Mary uses to cause the central event. It appears that unsubcate-
gorized-for arguments except subjects of intransitives are noncentral.
Thematic and instrumental with, then, are not themselves theta
assigners. Instead, their object, with the with as a marker on that object,
is the argument of some other lexical item, and it bears a theta role
assigned by that other lexical item (and see Baker 1987a for this same
conclusion regarding instrumental in PPs in Chichewa). I would analyze
other themes and instrumentals introduced by other Ps in the same way
(as in pairs such as Bill cleared the dishes from the table and Bill cleared the
table of the dishes where a theme is involved - see Jackendoff 1987b - and
idiomatic instrumentals such as on foot, by hand, in a taxi, etc.).
Jackendoff (1987b) argues that we interpret the object of theme with as
an argument of some other lexical item by way of a nonlexical rule that
operates once we throw the words together in a syntactic structure. His
analysis is consonant with mine here. An immediate question, then, is
whether argument structure can be adequately represented in the lexi-
con. After all, if a nonlexical rule can add an argument, then lexical
structure may well not reflect all the argument possibilities of a lexical
item. The reverberations of this question affect the Projection Principle,
discussed in section 4 below, which requires lexical properties of a lexical
item to be reflected at all the syntactic levels. This principle was form-
ulated with the assumption that one of the lexical properties was argu-
ment structure. But we are now questioning whether all information
about argument structure is truly present in the lexicon, and, depending
on our answer, the Projection Principle may well be affected. I think,
however, that Jackendoff s nonlexical rule does not necessarily threaten
the Projection Principle. All we need do is stipulate that certain lexical
items are subject to certain nonlexical rules. This stipulation is part of the
lexical information of a lexical item. Thus, the fact that spray, for
example, can take a theme that appears in a with phrase would be
encoded in the lexicon by way of the fact that spray can undergo the
nonlexical rule.
Other Ps which are essentially locative in nature have a strong
similarity to thematic and instrumental with when they co-occur with a
head of a predicate. When these Ps appear in an utterance with a head of a
predicate, the P is not lexically selected by the head of the predicate, but
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rather chosen because of the sense of the proposition the utterance
describes (in contrast to the Ps in (1-79) above). The object of a P in a
locative PP in such sentences is not an argument of the P itself. Instead,
the object of the P is an argument of the head of the predicate of the
clause. And the P functions to relate its syntactic object to the head of the
predicate. In Rothstein's terms (1983, p. 35), the P indicates the type of
thematic relation its object will have to the head of the predicate. For
example, consider:
(l-86)a. Mary went inside.
b. Mary went inside the house.
In (1-86) the P is a locative giving direction or position to the action. It
extends one action {went) into a new action {went inside). As such, the P is
part of the predicate (see sec. 1.1 above). The presence of an object of the
preposition in (l-86)b but not in (l-86)a specifies the goal of the direction
or position of the (newly formed) action, and, thus, introduces another
role player, the house, onto the scene. That is, in (1-86) the predicate is
went inside, but in (l-86)a it has only one role player, whereas in (l-86)b
it has two. However, in both sentences the theta assigner is went, where in
(l-86)a it takes one argument, but in (l-86)b it takes two.
In Jackendoffs (1983) sense, we can view these Ps as functions
converting things into places. That is, in the lexicon, a verb such as went in
(1-86) takes an optional place argument, not a thing argument. So in
order for a nominal object of a P to be an appropriate argument of such a
lexical item, it must be converted into a place via the P. The object of the
P, then, is not a location in isolation of context y but becomes a location by
virtue of being related to the verb via the locative P. And the exact kind of
location the NP becomes is affected by both the P and the V (the head of
the predicate). Below we see a variety of contexts and, thus, locative
functions of objects of Ps. We find the entirely parallel situation for
temporal PPs, where the temporal P converts a thing into a time. And the
creativity with which English approaches these PPs is reflected here in
some of the more metaphorical examples.
(1-87) on:
Sue found the jacket on the table.
I saw my shoes on Mary.
Jill tapped on Sally's window.
Mary arrived on time.
I bought the diamond on Sue's reassurance of a raise.
I swear it on everything I hold dear.
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over:
Peter drove his car over the manhole.
Dorothy went over the rainbow.
Santa drove the reindeers over the rooftops.
I leaned over Mikey's shoulder.
You went over his head by talking to the dean.
He's working over the weekend.
He'll run for president over my dead body.
Again we have an instance in which the object of a P receives a theta
role, but not from the P. Let me stress, however, that unlike with
instrumental with, the P itself does add more information than just the
function of locative. Thus locative in adds different information from
locative on, which adds different information from locative under, etc.
Therefore, it is not reasonable to analyze the P as being merely a reflex of
the thematic role of its object (in contrast to instrumental and theme
with). Instead, the head of the predicate and the P work together to tell us
precisely how the object of the P plays a role in the event. Thus we must
analyze the head of the predicate and the P together as a predicate. For
example, I analyze drive . . . over as a predicate in a sentence such as
Peter drove his car over the manhole (in (1-87) above).
We see here an important distinction between theta role and semantic
role. The verb went in (l-86)b, for example, assigns the theta role of
locative to the NP the house. But the predicate went inside in (l-86)b
assigns the semantic role to that NP, letting us know that this (now)
locative NP is a space that contains, rather than a space that is above or
below, etc. (That is, inside contributes to the semantic role of its object
NP.)
One advantage of analyzing the objects of the Ps in (l-86)-(l-87)
above as bearing theta roles and as being role players to the predicate of
the clause is that we can capture the similarity in function of NPs which
are objects of Ps in locative PPs to NPs which are objects of Vs where the
V incorporates a locative sense. And we can capture the same similarity
regarding the temporal sense. Thus, as Ken Hale (personal communica-
tion) has pointed out to me, the NP object of the V and the NP object of
the P have a similar function in each of the pairs below; my analysis
captures that fact.
(l-88)a. Our family occupied the house for seven years.
Our family lived in the house for seven years.
Heathfern approached the house.
Heathfern went toward the house.
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The panda entered the house.
The panda went into the house,
b. The letter A precedes the letter B.
The letter A comes before the letter B.
The letter B follows the letter A.
The letter B comes after the letter A.
(I am not suggesting that the pairs in (1-88) are synonymous, only that the
theta roles of the relevant NPs are identical in each pair. The semantic
roles of these NPs, however, vary as the predicates vary.)
In (l-86)-(l-88) the locative and temporal PPs co-occur with a
separate head of a predicate. But they certainly need not. I delay the
discussion of locative and temporal PPs in the absence of a separate head
of a predicate until later in this section.
In all the instances thus far, I have argued that the object of the P in
question receives a theta role, but not always from the P. Thus in (1-77)
the P is a theta assigner; in (1-79) the P transmits, but does not assign, the
theta role from the V to the P's object; in (1-80) the P is merely a reflex of
the theme theta role, but the object of the P receives its theta role from
the V; and in (l-86)b the object of the P receives its theta role from the
head of the predicate of its clause (but it receives its semantic role from
the entire predicate, which includes the P). (In this last case the P
converts its object into an appropriate argument for the lexical head -
that is, from a thing into a place.)
Let me now turn to some instances in which I argue that the object of
the P bears no theta role whatsoever.
To begin, consider sentences such as (1-89), where one might be
tempted to claim that Betty has a theta role.
(1-89) Beth will eat after Betty.
The most immediate reading we have for (1-89) out of context is that
Beth will eat after Betty eats. Thus Betty in (1-89) should get the same
theta role Beth gets - that is, whatever theta role eat assigns to this
argument.
I contend, however, that despite our first reading of (1-89) out of
context, Betty in (1-89) is not an argument of any event lexical item and
does not receive a theta role. To see this, let us put a sentence like (1-89)
in a context. Betty is auditioning for a dancing part in a musical. Beth is
the auditioner.
(1-90) -Hey, Beth! Come on, let's eat.
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-Hold on. One more audition. I'll eat after Betty. See, she's on stage
already. 5 minutes max.
Here it looks as if Betty should get the theta role appropriate for an
argument of dances (that is, we read (1-90) to mean, "I'll eat after Betty
dances"). One might say that since both eat and dance have an agent-
subject argument, there is no difference between the theta assignments
for the object of after in (1-89) and (1-90), and that thus we have no
evidence against allowing after to assign the theta role of agent to its
object. However, the object of after need not be understood as an
agent.
(l-91)a. I ate salad after the steak.
b. I ate a small snack after my bath.
c. I eat peas only after 4 o'clock.
In (l-91)a our most immediate reading would have the steak getting the
theta role of theme since it is an appropriate theme argument of the verb
ate. In (l-91)b we might try to say that my bath gets the theta role of
theme since it is an appropriate theme argument of some unexpressed
verb such as took. In (l-91)c we have to admit that the object of after is
simply a modifying time expression and is not an argument of any lexical
head, thus it cannot have a theta role.
The above discussion shows that were we to maintain an analysis of
sentences such as (1-89) through (1-91) in which the object of after gets a
theta role, we would have to allow some abstract verbs at the level
relevant for theta-role assignment which assign the appropriate theta
roles in order to account for the differences just noted between the roles
of the objects of after in (1-89) and (l-91)a&b. That is, after could not by
itself randomly assign agent or theme or no theta roles to its object.
Instead, we would need an as yet undefined process of constructing
abstract verbs and precisely the right abstract verbs to give the theta role
to the object of after that is appropriate in the particular sentence in a
given situation, or, alternatively and equally as magical and undefined,
some process of deleting abstract verbs before the sentences reach
phonological form. Furthermore, we still would be in a quandary over
(l-91)c, where no theta role is assigned to the object of after.
The theoretical and empirical problems raised by this approach are
reminiscent of the types of problems that came up with the proposals for
deletion rules of Comparative Ellipsis and Conjunction Reduction in the
1960s. And for much the same reasons that we have abandoned the bogus
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deletion rules of Comparative Ellipsis and Conjunction Reduction (see
Napoli 1983), we here abandon this approach to after phrases.
We see, then, that (1-89) through (1-91) have objects of after which
receive no theta role. This is a welcome conclusion, since there is nothing
in the conceptual structure of eat which would suggest that it takes a
temporally sequential argument. That is, we have a very different
situation here from that in (1-86). Verbs of motion, like went in (1-86),
entail a location as part of their conceptual structure - the very idea of
space is encoded in the lexical items. Thus it is conceptually appropriate
for went to take a locative argument. The location is, in an admittedly
abstract but no less conceptually real way, a participant or role player in
the event. But a verb like eat does not encode the very idea of sequential
time any more than, say, cough or breathe. And, accordingly, a phrase
like after NP (as in (1-91)) can appear in a clause with (almost) any verb.
After in (1—89)—(1—91) relates its object sequentially in time to the
proposition expressed by the words preceding after. The semantics are
skeletal: after indicates only temporal sequence. But the context of the
utterance allows us to fill out a reasonable interpretation of the utterance,
sometimes to the point of letting us imagine a sequence of propositions
(as in (1-90) and (l-91)a&b). Prepositional phrases of this sort are
strikingly similar in their semantics to so-called comparative ellipsis
phrases and are another example of the "efficiency" of language (where I
mean the term as developed by Barwise and Perry 1983). The point for us
is that we can account for the semantics of sentences like those in (1-89)
through (1-91) without claiming that the object of after has a theta role;
we would have problems of both an empirical and a theoretical nature if
we took the opposite stance, that the object of after did receive a theta
role from after.
The above discussion used only one preposition: after. One might
argue that after is unique in not being a theta assigner. However, similar
discussions could be made based on other prepositions, such as the
concomitant sense of with (in contrast to the theme with of (1-81)
discussed above). I offer the examples in (1-92) and leave the reader to
construct the discussion. (Caveat: With can also introduce an absolutive
that can be a clause (with the Accusative-/ftg construction studied in
Reuland 1983: With Mary crying, how can we just walk out?) or a simple
NP plus sister predicate (as in van Riemsdijk 1978: With the buses on
strike, let's walk). See Napoli (1987a) for a full discussion. As you test out
(1-92) below, be sure not to use the absolutive constructions.)
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(1-92) She left with Barbara.
She ate peas with cream.
She left with no regrets.
She answered with aplomb.
She danced with the music.
She danced with a cheerful smile.
In general, all prepositions which are open to relating an entire
proposition to some other point, such as temporal sequence (e.g. after),
temporal consequence (e.g. with), and temporal precedence (e.g.
before), as well as causal sequence (e.g. because (of)) exhibit behavior
similar to that discussed above for the after sentences. And I argue that in
all such uses, the object of the P receives no theta role.
A question unanswered thus far is precisely what semantic function the
PPs in (1—89)—(1—91) have. I argued in section 1.1 that adverbials which
are not themselves role players are parts of the predicate. Thus these PPs
would be part of the predicate: they are modifiers. (With a more abstract
approach to predication than mine, of course, the familiar alternative
that these PPs are themselves predicates, taking the entire proposition
minus the PP as their role player, arises. See the discussion in sec. 1.1.)
In sum, Ps are relational words that connect some other entity to their
object. Ps such as inside, in, over, etc. in sentences like those in (1-86)-
(1-88) are part of the predicate and relate the head of the predicate to
their object by indicating the specific nature of the locative role their
object plays in the event. On the other hand, Ps such as after, concomitant
with, before, etc. in sentences like those in (1—89)—(1—91) relate the entire
proposition of the clause they appear in minus the PP to some point
outside that proposition, which is denoted by the object of the P. In the
first instance the object of the P receives a theta role from the head of the
predicate; in the second instance, it receives no theta role.
Before I leave this subsection, let me point out that I take the object of
by in a passive sentence not to bear a theta role. Justification of this
position is found in chapter 2, section 8.
Let us now turn to propositions in which a PP does not co-occur with a
separate head of a predicate. Consider first the locative Ps.
(1-93) Mary is inside the house.
Here the property of being inside is attributed to Mary. We, as speakers
of such a sentence, do not present the concept of inside as being a location
or direction which extends some other action or position into a new event.
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That is, we do not present inside as an extension of some other item, in
contrast to how we present it in:
(1-94) Mary ran inside the house.
Rather, we present the concept of inside in (1-93) as a coherent whole:
we view inside as denoting an event in itself. Thus inside is a predicate in
(1-93). And it takes two role players: Mary and the house. In (1-94),
instead, ran inside is the predicate, again taking two role players.
We can now see that whether or not a lexical item has an event
structure cannot be determined in isolation of context. All Ps have the
potential to be viewed as events and to have argument structures. But the
crucial question for the analysis of any given utterance is how we view the
P in that utterance.
One might object to this contextual approach to the event structure of
lexical items and try to get around it by analyzing the copula in (1-93) as
the head of the predicate rather than as merely a grammatical word (and
see Jackendoff 1983). Then in both (1-93) and (1-94) the P would be part
of the predicate but it would not head the predicate. Such an alternative
cannot work, however, since the copula plays no semantic role in (1-93) -
witness (1-95), where no copula is present but the same semantic
relationship holds between Mary and inside as in (1-93) (and see the
discussion of (1-3) at the opening of this chapter).
(1-95) I want Mary inside this house by midnight!
Any analysis which treats is in (1-93) as the head of the predicate would
have to posit some abstract BE function in a sentence like (1-95). (The
BE here represents an abstract function that need not have any lexical
realization.) Our very nonabstract approach to predication does not
allow for such an abstract BE.
Temporal Ps can also occur in such copular sentences, as can many
other kinds of Ps:
(1-96) Mary is before Bill.
Here before is viewed as denoting a coherent event, the state of
temporally preceding. The predicate, then, is before, and it takes two role
players: Mary and Bill.
Thus in both (1-93) and (1-96) the object of the P receives a theta role
from the P itself, in contrast to (1-94), where the object of the P receives a
theta role from the V, and sentences like (1-89), where the object of the P
receives no theta role at all.
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We see from everything in this subsection so far that the object of P
may or may not receive a theta role, and, if it does, that theta role may or
may not be assigned by the P alone. In fact, only in examples like those in
(1-77), (1-93), (1-95), and (1-96) is the P alone a theta assigner. Thus, in
most uses, P is not a theta assigner.
This conclusion is interesting in several ways. First, others have argued
on independent grounds that P is not a theta assigner (Gunnarson 1986,
p. 32, Giorgi 1984, among others).
Second, P is a defective lexical category in ways other than just theta
assignment. Frequently it has been claimed that P is not a proper
governor for binding theory, in contrast to N, A, and V (Kayne 1981b;
Chomsky 1981, sec. 5.1; Safir 1985, pp. 51, 88; Aoun 1985, p.68, among
others). P is also the only lexical category that is closed (Emonds 1985);
for example, there are a limited number of Ps (as opposed to other lexical
categories), and new ones are not likely to be coined. And objects of P,
unlike objects of V, are not subject to theDefiniteness Effect (Safir 1985).
Third, while we cannot call P a grammatical rather than lexical
category (since grammatical categories in the sense of Emonds 1985 have
no purely semantic feature, whereas Ps generally do, except for the null
preposition of), monosyllabic Ps are minor categories in prosodic trees,
while all other lexical categories are major categories (see Nespor and
Vogel 1982). And many Ps have special phonological properties, behav-
ing in ways like syntactic dependents and clitics (see Chomsky and Halle
1968, Kean 1981, among others). Furthermore, Ps have some of the
characteristics of functional elements in Abney's (1986) sense.
We would hope that the defectiveness of P in all the above ways would
be explained by a single account. Unfortunately, I do not have one to
offer, nor do I expect that any such account will be rapidly forthcoming.
For example, Ps are theta assigners in certain contexts and in those same
contexts Ps behave like proper governors. So we might connect those two
facts by claiming that only theta assigners can be proper governors. On
the other hand, all Ps are Case assigners, so unless the notion of proper
government can be shown to be different for binding theory from that for
Case theory, this explanation looks unpromising. (And such fracturiza-
tion of the notion of proper government would threaten the explanatory
value of the notion - thus I hope it would be avoided in any case.)
Furthermore, the fact that polysyllabic Ps behave differently phonologi-
cally from monosyllabic Ps seems to be an unrelated fact, so far as I can
see.
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Let me end with an important fact: if it is a theta assigner, P - like A and
V but unlike N - must take one argument which appears outside the PP
that the P heads.
2.5 Phrasal predicates
As has already been pointed out, there are instances in which whole
phrases can be predicates. For example, phrases which form lexical
items, such as metaphorical PPs and fixed-phrase VPs, can be predicates.
Here the predicate is in boldface:
(1-97) That analysis is off the wall.
(1-98) John flew into a rage.
And, frequently, a predicate just happens to comprise an entire phrase.
Thus intransitive VPs are often predicates:
(1-99) John ran inside quickly.
But they need not be:
(1-100) John ran inside the house quickly.
Phrases can be predicates in at least two instances, then: either the
phrase is a lexical item which denotes an event (as in (1—97)—(1—98)); or
the phrase just happens to contain no material other than the predicate
(as in (1-99)).
Naturally, if a whole phrase is a predicate, then it must have at least one
role player (which is also an argument - see the discussion of (1-45) above
in sec. 1.6) which, per force, appears outside that phrase, since every
predicate must have a role player (see sec. 1.5). Furthermore, phrasal
predicates are limited to precisely one role player (see Emonds 1985).
This follows from the fact that every category X that we have examined
above which can head a predicate can take at most one argument external
toXP.
Let us now turn to a closer look at the issue of VP predicates and at
whether entire clauses can be predicates.
2.6 Concerning VP and CP as predicates
Many linguists have assumed or argued that all predicates are phrasal
(Stowell 1981, Chomsky 1981, Aoun and Sportiche 1983, Marantz 1984,
among many others). In particular, Stowell (1981) has argued that VP
rather than V is a predicate, and most works within GB follow Stowell on
this point.
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In this chapter we have seen that predicates can be single words,
continuous strings of words that do not form a syntactic constituent,
discontinuous strings of words that do not form a syntactic constituent, as
well as entire phrases. It is important, then, that I counter the arguments
of Marantz for the analysis of VP as a predicate.
Marantz argues that VP is the theta assigner for an argument in
G(rammatical) F(unction) subject position, rather than V - thus for us
that would mean that the entire VP is the predicate. Marantz's proposal is
based partially on an inaccurate claim about the data (and partially on a
discussion of idioms, to which Rothstein 1983 responds in a way con-
sistent with my approach). He says that keeping a verb fixed and varying
the DO can affect the theta role of an argument in GF subject position, as
in (1-101), where I use my own examples rather than his. But no such
variability is found in the theta role of the argument found in DO
position.
(l-101)a. Mary threw the ball.
b. Mary threw a party.
c. Mary threw a fit.
d. Mary threw up.
In (l-101)a&b Mary is agentive; in (l-101)c it is debatable whether Mary
is agentive or experiences in (l-101)d Mary is experiencer. Marantz
would conclude from (1-101) that it is not the verb threw that is assigning
a theta role to Mary in each of these sentences but the whole VP.
However, exactly the same kind of variability is found in the theta role of
the argument in DO position if we hold the verb fixed and vary the
argument in GF subject position. (The examples in (1-102) were sug-
gested to me by my intermediate syntax class, winter term 1986, Univer-
sity of Michigan.)
(l-102)a. The ball struck Mary.
b. The idea struck Mary.
c. Multiple sclerosis (suddenly) struck Mary.
Here Mary is a patient in (l-102)a, perhaps a theme in (l-102)b, and an
experiencer in (l-102)c.
If we were to conclude from (1-101) that the V plus its DO is a theta-
role assigner, we would be led to conclude from (1-102) that the V plus its
GF subject is a theta-role assigner, a regrettable conclusion for anyone's
theory.
One might argue that sentences like (l-102)b&c are metaphorical, and
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thus extensions of the "real" use of struck, seen in (l-102)a, where the
DO gets a patient role. But the same objection would then hold for the
sentences of (1-101), where the (b) and (c) examples can be seen as
metaphorical. The important point is that (1-101) and (1-102) present
entirely parallel questions and problems regarding theta-role assignment.
Thus there is no asymmetry between DO and GF subject position with
respect to theta-role assignment by a V. Accordingly, Marantz's argu-
ment that VP is a predicate, which is based on such a proposed asym-
metry, is vitiated.
Notice, of course, that it is also debatable whether there is a single verb
threw in (1-101) and a single verb struck in (1-102), as Bill Croft (personal
communication) has pointed out to me. But I will ignore that debate here
in the interest of showing that Marantz's argument is inconsistent
internally, even if only a single verb is involved in these examples.
In sum, I reject Marantz's position that VP is a theta-role assigner and
reiterate that only lexical items can assign theta roles. Other arguments
for rejecting VP as a theta assigner are found in Rothstein (1983).
Given that only lexical items assign theta roles, we will say that in
(1-101) the lexical head threw takes Mary as an argument and assigns a
theta role to that argument. Likewise in (1-102) the lexical head struck
takes Mary as an argument and assigns a theta role to that argument.
However, the theta role that is assigned with these verbs may vary. This is
a common situation, as we saw above in section 1.6 with the discussion of
A distinct instance of the common claim that VP is a predicate regards
the analysis of sentences involving NP movement:
(1-103) Mary [Vp appears [t to have understood]].
Here Williams (1980) argues that the matrix VP is a predicate by virtue of
the presence of the trace, which makes the VP an open function,
according to him. I have adopted an event-structure approach to the
definition of predicate, which has little to do with the notion of an open
function except for the fact that predicates require at least one role
player. Thus a phrase would be an open function only if one of the role
players of the predicate were missing from the phrase. I would therefore
not analyze the VP in (1-103) as a single predicate. Instead, the predicate
here is the discontinuous string appears . . . to have understood, and the
trace, being a trace of NP movement, is an anaphor. As an anaphor, this
trace is a legitimate role player of the predicate, thus the VP is not an
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge. rg/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511519963.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 15:42:54, subject to the Cambridge Core
Categories that can be predicates 61
open function in any way relevant to predication: there are no role
players missing from this phrase. In chapter 6 I will argue that the
principles of coindexing a predicate and its subject role player (which I
present in ch. 2, but see sec. 4 below for a definition of subject role player)
can be extended to cover the coindexing of an anaphor and its ante-
cedent. Thus my analysis will capture the similarities between the
coindexing of trace and Mary in (1-103) and the coindexing between a
predicate and its subject role player while still maintaining an event-
structure notion of predicate.
Williams (1980) is also responsible for the claim that S' (or, in our
terms, CP) can be a predicate. (By S' Williams intends the phrase
consisting of a clause plus its introductory complementizer node. By CP I
mean the phrase headed by the complementizer node.) Let me consider
that analysis of his which has gained the most following: that instances of
obligatory control are predicates. Thus Williams would analyze the
embedded clauses here as predicates:
(1-104) Mary wanted [PRO to leave].
(1-105) Mary is [PRO to leave by 5].
According to Williams, these clauses can be predicates because they are
open by virtue of the presence of PRO. However, while the clauses here
have a phonetic hole, so to speak, they are not open in the sense relevant
to predication. The PRO in obligatory control clauses is an anaphor (see
Hornstein and Lightfoot 1987) - thus these clauses, like the VP in (1-103)
above, are closed. These clauses therefore cannot be predicates.
However, since the coindexing principles for anaphors and predicates are
the same (see ch. 6), the similarities between such sentences and
instances of predication are not only unproblematic, but expected (see
also ch. 2, sec. 9).
Example (1-105) is important to take a closer look at, however. In all
the examples of copular sentences that we have seen thus far, be is a
grammatical word. However, in (1-105) if be were a grammatical word,
the GF subject Mary would not be licensed in the sense of Chomsky
(1986b) (given that I do not analyze the embedded clause as a predicate).
Therefore, this use of be must not be as a grammatical word. And, in fact,
it is not. The be here expresses obligation or intention and is not simply a
word that carries the tense (see also Safir 1985 and Williams 1983a, who
argue that there are two senses of be).
There are still at least two other types of open clauses which are
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candidates for being analyzed as predicates: restrictive relative clauses
and appositive relative clauses. But restrictive relative clauses are sisters
to the head N they describe (see ch. 3, sec. 2), and thus fall within the NP
of the N they describe. This collocation is that of modifiers, not predi-
cates, as was argued in section 1.4 above.
Appositive relative clauses, however, will be argued in chapter 5,
section 5 to be outside the NP they are related to at SS - and, in fact, to
predicate of that NP. (By SS I intend the level of structure at the output of
the syntactic component of the grammar.)
In sum, VPs are predicates only when they consist of phrasal lexical
items or when a predicate just happens to comprise an entire VP (as in
(1-99) versus (1-100) in sec. 2.5 above). But CPs can be predicates only
when they are open (that is, when they contain a variable) and when they
are not modifiers. At least one such case arises: the appositive relative
clause.
3 Categories that can be role players
Any phrase that can be an argument can be a role player (by virtue of the
Principle of Coincidence in (1-46)). Thus far the role players we have
looked at are NPs. However, clauses can be arguments.
(1-106) Jane insisted that we come back.
I'm hopeful that he'll come back.
Jane's insistence that we come back surprised me.
And, as was mentioned earlier, some have argued that all subcate-
gorized-for elements are role players. If this were so, subcategorized-for
locative phrases would be role players:
(1-107) The doctor put notes on Sally's chart.
I have argued (sec. 2.4 above) that, instead of the entire locative PP being
a role player, the object of the P is a role player and the P is part of the
predicate. Thus the predicate in (1-107) would be put. . . on.
We will find in chapter 2 that the principles of coindexing between a
subject role player and a predicate are unchanged whether we analyze the
object of the P or the whole PP as a role player in (1-107), so long as in
either analysis the object of the P receives a theta role (in the analysis with
the whole PP as a role player this might be by way of inheritance from the
PP to its object NP).
There is another analysis of sentences like (1-107) that I have not yet
discussed - that of Simpson (1983b). (I do not have access to this work,
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but it is referred to in Hale and Keyser 1986. I present here my
understanding of the work and I apologize for any unintentional mis-
representation.) Simpson argues that the verb put takes the entire
locative PP as its argument, but that locative PP is itself a predicate.
Simpson uses the term "translative small clause" to describe the type of
relationship that holds between the sister arguments of put in (1-107)
(that is, between notes and on Sally's chart). I am unsure whether or not
in this analysis the NP Sally's chart would receive a theta role or not, and,
if it did, which item would be its theta assigner. It is quite possible that
Simpson would allow Sally's chart io be a role player of the predicate even
while analyzing the entire PP as the predicate (just as Williams 1980 and
Marantz 1984 allow the DO to be a role player even though they analyze
the VP that contains the DO as the predicate).
I will maintain my original analysis of sentences like (1-107), in which
the NP and not the PP is a role player of the predicate, and I leave open
the question of whether or not the alternative analyses I have discussed
here would be consistent with my coindexing principles given in chapter
2.
Some theta assigners definitely do take arguments that are themselves
predicates, however (and see Chierchia 1985):
(l-108)a. The medication rendered John helpless.
b. The confirmation of Sarah as a Catholic freaked out Arnie.
In (l-108)a the AP helpless is an argument of rendered and at the same
time it is a predicate (taking John as its role player). To see this, notice
that helpless licenses/o/m (*We rendered John), whereas adjunct (that is,
nonargument) predicates must be licensed by their subject role player
(and see Emonds 1985, p. 83). Other predicates of other categories can be
arguments of rendered (The medication rendered John out of control/a
bumbling idiot). In (l-108)b the PP as a Catholic is an argument of the
head N rendered, where here a Catholic is a predicate taking Sarah as its
role player.
It appears that NP, AP, PP, and clauses can all be arguments of lexical
items. So all phrasal nodes can be role players of predicates.
4 Theta assignment
All arguments of an event lexical item receive a theta role. In this chapter
we have seen that arguments of a lexical item can appear inside the
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maximal projection of the syntactic head of the lexical item or outside
that maximal projection. (Recall that I allow strings like take . . . to task
in (1-18) to be a lexical item. Thus it makes sense to talk of the syntactic
head of a lexical item, where the X that heads the minimal XP that
contains the entire lexical item is the syntactic head of the lexical item.)
When arguments appear inside the relevant maximal projection, they
are either (a) sisters to the syntactic head of the lexical item, or (b) objects
of a P where the P is part of the lexical item (as in look after), or (c) objects
of a P where the PP is a sister to the lexical item (as in depend on). (Recall
that I analyze arguments of N which appear in specifier position as
originating in sister position in DS. Thus either these arguments or their
trace will be sisters to N at the point of theta assignment.) I will call the (a)
case "sister arguments." I will call both the (b) and (c) cases "preposi-
tional arguments."
Two very common principles of theta assignment will account for theta
assignment to sister and prepositional arguments.
(1-109) Direct Theta Assignment: A lexical item assigns a theta role to its sister
arguments.
(1-110) Compositional Theta Assignment: A lexical item assigns a theta role to
its prepositional arguments.
These principles are similar to those commonly assumed in GB (as in
Chomsky 1981), as well as in other theories (such as Lexical Functional
Grammar, as in Bresnan 1982a&b). Notice that the term "composi-
tional" in (1-110) is, actually, a misnomer, since I am not claiming that
the P need have any part in the assignment of the theta role (it might, as in
sentences with look after; and it might not, as in sentences with think of). I
adopt this rubric despite the fact that it is a misnomer, since the cases of
theta assignment meant to be covered by (1-110) are the same as those
meant to be covered by the principle called Compositional Theta Assign-
ment in Chomsky (1981).
There are two very important distinctions, however, between the
principles as stated here and those commonly assumed in the literature.
First, theta assignment as stated here applies only to arguments. And
arguments are not syntactically identifiable (see sec. 2 above, where I
argue that sisters to a lexical head need not be arguments of that head).
Thus these principles are semantic in nature. The reference to syntactic
structure (to sisters and to prepositional sisters) is needed in order to
account for the data we have seen in this chapter, all of which come from
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English. The same kinds of data precisely would lead us to the same
principles if we had looked at Italian, instead. And I believe that the same
kinds of data exist in all configurational languages (in the sense of
Chomsky 1981 - that is, languages which exhibit a VP). Thus these
principles are syntactic only insofar as the languages they apply to are
configurational. That is, the nature of theta assignment is NOT configura-
tional itself - it is semantic, applying to arguments wherever they happen
to be located. But in configurational languages the arguments internal to
the maximal projection of the head of the lexical item theta assigner will
be sisters or prepositional sisters.
Second, Compositional Theta Assignment as stated here is not to be
interpreted as a form of syntactic reanalysis. That is, I am not claiming
that a lexical head and a P be syntactically restructured into a new
constituent (contra both the restructuring rule of GB and the verb-
preposition incorporation rule of Lexical Functional Grammar (hereafter
LFG)). To the contrary, I argue at length against such restructuring in
chapter 2, section 3.
Examples of arguments which receive theta roles by Direct Theta
Assignment are the italicized items here, where the theta assigners are in
boldface:
(1-111) Jack kicked the ball.
Your book is worth two cents.
(See Maling 1982 for the analysis of worth as a P.) Direct Theta
Assignment may apply to more than one argument of a given lexical item,
as in the double object construction (contra Emonds 1985, p. 62):
(1-112) I'll bake [you] [a cake].
Examples of arguments which receive theta roles by Compositional
Theta Assignment are the italicized items here, where the theta assigner
is again in boldface:
(1-113) That announcement of Jack's shocked everyone.
I'm counting on you.
He isn't inclined toward leniency.
Look after him for me, won't you?
Drop the trash into that can, please.
Notice that IOs when introduced with a P also receive their theta role by
way of Compositional Theta Assignment:
(1-114) I'll bake a cake for you.
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And, like Direct Theta Assignment, Compositional Theta Assignment
may apply to more than one argument of a given lexical item:
(1-115) The lecture of Bill's on birth control was an anticlimax, so to speak.
It is commonly claimed that principles of theta assignment hold at DS.
However, so long as movement leaves a trace (as in GB) and theta
assignment can be to traces, there is no need to specify the level at which
these principles hold. I take these principles, then, to account for theta
assignment to the italicized arguments here:
(1-116) Jack's announcement [t] wrecked havoc.
What can the children eat [t]?
What can he be thinking of [t]?
That is, the lexical item assigns a theta role to the trace and, by virtue of
being in a chain with that trace, the italicized items in (1-116) are
understood to bear a theta role.
Arguments of a lexical item that appear outside the maximal projection
of the syntactic head of that lexical item also receive theta roles, but not
by the principles in (l-109)-(l-110). As Emonds (1985) has noted, at
most one argument may appear outside the relevant maximal projection.
I propose the following principle to handle theta assignment to such
arguments.
(1-117) External Theta Assignment: A lexical item may assign a theta role to at
most one argument that is external to the maximal projection of (the
head of) the lexical item.
(Again, recall that I allow lexical items which are strings of words - thus it
makes sense to talk about "the head" of a lexical item.)
This principle differs drastically from the generally accepted third
principle of theta assignment in GB, which is called Indirect Theta
Assignment. With Indirect Theta Assignment a theta role is transmitted
from a V via a VP to the GF subject of the clause. Instead, (1-117) makes
no mention of anything indirect about this theta assignment: it is directly
from the theta assigner to the argument. Furthermore, (1-117) makes no
mention of where the external argument may be, only that it must be, in
fact, external (that is, outside the phrase).
Let us recapitulate for a moment. In (1-118) all the boldface words are
predicates in the sense developed in section 1.
(1-118) Jack discussed Bill's refusal [PRO to consider the best lawyer's resigna-
tion from the firm].
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(That to in to consider is part of the predicate follows from the fact that to
is an auxiliary. See Pullum 1982 and Napoli 1985.) Predicates can, of
course, consist of more than just an event lexical item, as when a specifier
or a modifier is part of the predicate (see sec. 1.1 above). But all the
arguments of the lexical item that heads the predicate will be role players
of the predicate, even if the predicate consists of more than just its head
(that is, even if the predicate consists of more than just the event lexical
item). We know this from the Principle of Coincidence in (1-46).
We can see, then, that the question of where the external argument
covered by principle (1-117) can be is the same question as where the
external role player of a predicate can be. This is true even though
external role players of a predicate may have originated as internal
arguments of the head of the predicate in DS. For example, the GF
subject of a passive sentence (derived via movement in GB) is an external
role player for its predicate, but it originated as an internal argument (a
sister argument).
In section 2 above we saw that A, V, and P, when they are used with an
argument structure, must take an external argument. Furthermore, when
whole phrases are lexical items that have an argument structure (as in the
idiomatic PPs and VPs of sec. 2.5 above), they per force take an external
argument. If we couple this with the fact that every predicate must have at
least one role player, we can see that the external argument is a special
argument. Only N does not require an external argument: N can take an
external argument (and optional internal ones, as well); or it can take
only internal arguments:
(1-119) [Jack] is [NP a failure (at tennis)].
(1-120) [NP Jack's argument about Bill] convinced me.
In (1-119) the N failure assigns a theta role to Jack, which is external, and
to tennis, which is internal. In (1-120) the N argument assigns a theta role
to the genitive NP and to the object of the P, both of which are internal to
the NP.
We can now see that predicates headed by N must be singled out from
all other predicates, since all other predicates must have an external role
player, but predicates headed by N need not. Let me now define one
more term:
(1-121) Subject Role Player. The external argument of a lexical item at SS is the
subject role player of a predicate headed by that lexical item.
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(I choose SS as the level of interest in (1-121), since the notion of subject
role player relates to the GB notion of subject - as we will see in ch. 2 -
and Chomsky (1986b) has argued that his Extended Projection Principle,
which requires that V have a subject, holds at SS. In ch. 2, sec. 21 discuss
this further.)
We need a special definition for subject role players of N, however, in
precisely those cases where N does not have an external argument at SS.
Recall that if N has multiple arguments where all are internal and where
one is nonprepositional and nonobjective, then one of its arguments will
be a genitive in English, whether it occurs in specifier or in sister position
(thus we get the death of John, but that lecture of John's on birth control-
see sec. 2.3 above). And N never has more than one genitive argument
{*John's picture of Bill's). I can now offer the following definition:
(1-122) Subject Role Player ofN: If an N takes only one argument in the lexicon,
that argument is the subject role player of the predicate headed by the
N.
If an N has no external argument at SS but does have a genitive
argument, the genitive argument is the subject role player of the
predicate headed by the N.
Condition: (1-122) holds only if (1-121) does not apply.
Of course, the definition in (1-122) holds only for English and not for
Italian, since Italian does not have genitive NPs.
(1-123) il libro di Moravia sulla guerra
'the book of Moravia's on the war'
We might be able to modify (1-122) to accommodate Italian by talking
about which P can introduce the subject role player of an N (where the P
di is the most likely counterpart to the English genitive Case). However,
there is another serious problem with (1-122): the definition in (1-122)
will not help us determine which argument is the subject role player if an
N has no external argument and no genitive argument, as in the case of an
N with an implicit argument in a sentence such as (1-37), repeated here:
(1-37) The destruction of the city [PRO to prove a point] was deplorable.
Is the city or the implicit argument (the argument that controls PRO) the
subject role player of destruction in (1-37)? Both are arguably internal, so
(1-121) does not help us. And neither is observably genitive, so (1-122)
does not help us.
There is one thing in common about all subject role players of N which
are identified by (1-122) that one might try to use in determining the
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subject role player of sentences like (1-123) and (1-37). Notice that the
internal argument of N that is identified as the subject role player in
(1-122) is the argument that would be the external argument of the
predicate with a V or A head that most closely corresponds to the sense of
the N, if such a V or A exists:
(l-124)a. The death of Jack . . .
Jack died.
b. Jack's argument that we should leave . . .
Jack argued that we should leave.
(1-125) Jack's happiness at the news . . .
Jack was happy at the news.
One might propose that some comparison of NPs with clauses would help
us to determine which argument of an N is its subject role player.
However, this approach is fraught with problems. For one, many NPs
with head Ns that I have argued do have argument structures do not easily
map into any corresponding clause.
(1-126) Jack's book about the war . . .
As we noted in section 2.3 regarding examples like (1-75), repeated here,
(1-75) Mary's photograph of Sue . . .
the genitive NP in such NPs can be understood to have performed a range
of activities with respect to the theme argument. Thus there is no one
clause to map such NPs into. Furthermore, many Ns that do have
morphologically corresponding As do not always have the same relation-
ship to their arguments as the corresponding As do to their arguments.
(1-127) Jack's guilt about the divorce . . .
(1-128) Jack is guilty.
Jack in (1-127) feels guilt, which is a quite different relationship to the
concept of guilt from that of Jack in (1-128), where Jack actually is guilty.
I believe the above tack raises more problems than it solves and shows
that we need an analysis of conceptual structure in order to get at the
proper definition of subject role player. This book, however, is not an
investigation of conceptual structure - and cannot become one. Thus the
best we can hope for here is a definition that is descriptively adequate.
While I realize that the lack of a more conceptual definition of subject
role player may leave the reader dissatisfied, the major goal of this work is
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not really threatened by the absence of such a definition. That is, even if
we cannot give a proper definition of subject role player, so long as we can
recognize the role players of a predicate, we can go on to develop the
principles which govern the domains in which predicates and their role
players must appear. And that is the major job of this book.
For now, then, let us keep aiming at a more descriptively adequate
definition of subject role players for nominal predicates. A reconsider-
ation of (1-125) and (1-75) can help. In these NPs the genitive NP bears
an agentive theta role, regardless of what specific action that NP actually
performed. I therefore propose the following definition:
(1-129) Subject Role Player ofN- definition two - The agentive argument of an
N is the subject role player of the predicate headed by the N.
Condition: (1-129) holds only if (1-121) and (1-122) do not apply.
This definition will now cover both Italian and the instances of NPs in
which the N has implicit arguments.
Notice that we need both (1-129) and (1-122), since there are instances
in which an N has more than one argument, but none of them is agentive,
as in (1-127).
Let me point out that in all the examples we have seen where we
posited an implicit argument, that implicit argument was agentive. If all
implicit arguments are, in fact, agentive, then all implicit arguments will
turn out to be subject role players. This is precisely the result we would
expect with Chomsky's (1986b) Extended Projection Principle, in which
he holds that subjects need not be syntactically realized, but objects must
be (p. 116).
Clearly the fracturization of the definition of subject role player
(hereafter srp) is regrettable and surely indicates that further work needs
to be done here. Given the fact that N does not require an external
argument, I see no possibility for conflating the definitions of srp of N
with that of srp of all other types of lexical items except by way of a
conceptual definition of srp, a definition that is not readily forthcoming. I
therefore leave the issue open, hoping only to have offered definitions
that are descriptively accurate.
Let us see now what these three definitions mean for the analysis of
different instances of predication. First, the boldface words in all the
sentences below are the predicates, where an arrow goes from the head of
the predicate to its subject role player. (Some sentences have more than
one predicate, but I have marked only one for exemplification.)
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(1-130) Mary wants potato chips very much.
[That John would ever leave Sue] is ridiculous.
The children aren't onto you yet.
Those men are fools.
We admire Jennifer as a flutist.
t I
Every photograph of Jennifer as a child is blurred.
I consider Jeff out of his mind.
LJ
In (1-130) we have one predicate headed by V, one by A, one by P, and
three by N, as well as a PP predicate, all of which have an external
argument.
Now let us consider some Ns that have only internal arguments. Here
again the predicate we are focusing on is in boldface, and an arrow goes
from the head of the predicate to its subject role player.
(1-131) The death of John upset us all.
That lecture of Bill's on birth control was informative.
i t
That gem of a centerfielder is my brother!
I f
(For the analysis of the NP in the last sentence of (1-131) as involving
predication, see ch. 4.)
In analyzing (1-130) and (1-131), we have used only (1-121) and
(1-122). Now let us look at some sentences where we have to use the
definition in (1-129).
(1-132) The destruction of that city was a shock to all of us.
Here there is an implicit agentive agent of destruction. We know that
from the fact that we could add a rationale clause to (1-132), and the
implicit agentive argument would control the PRO (as in (1-37) repeated
above in this section). This implicit agentive agent is the subject role
player of the predicate (and it is impossible to draw an arrow to it).
There is at least one more interesting point about the analyses that our
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definition(s) of subject role player leads us to. Given (1-122), in an NP
such as that in (1-133) we must call the city the subject role player of the
predicate headed by destruction:
(1-133) The city's destruction by the Huns was a shock.
In fact, given the definition of srp in (1-121), in the passive sentence in
(1-134) we must call the city the subject role player of the predicate
headed by destroyed.
(1-134) The city was destroyed by the Huns.
I believe that this is a correct analysis. I will argue in chapter 2, section 8
that an NP such as the Huns in (1-133) and (1-134), which is the object of
a passive by, is not an argument of any predicate. Rather, these by
phrases are part of the predicate (they are adverbial modifiers). For now,
I merely point out the analyses of (1-133) and (1-134) which follow from
my definitions of subject role player.
Returning to the principle of External Theta Assignment in (1-117),
given the definitions of subject role player, we can see that whatever
requirements there might be on the relative position an external argu-
ment can hold to its theta assigner will be subsumed under the require-
ments that hold on the relative position a subject role player can hold to
its predicate. It will be the purpose of chapter 2 to lay out those
requirements. I therefore leave (1-117) with no further stipulations
added.
There are, however, still some loose strings to tie up. For one, in
section 1.4 I adopted the position that there can be more than one
instance of predication in a single clause. At this point we can state our
Theta Criterion (which is essentially that of Williams 1980, Schein 1982a
and b, Rothstein 1983, Chomsky 1986b, Higginbotham 1985, and
others).
(1-135) Theta Criterion: Every argument of a lexical item is assigned one and
only one theta role by that lexical item.
Every theta role of a lexical item is assigned to one and only one of its
arguments.
This Theta Criterion allows an element to receive a theta role for each
argument structure it belongs to.
Emonds (1985, p. 68) notes that whenever an item receives two theta
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roles, it must be the subject of one of the theta assigners. Let me restate
Emonds' observation as a principle:
(1-136) Functional Criterion: If an XP receives a theta role from two non-
intersecting sources, then it must be the subject role player of at least
one of those sources.
(This criterion, of course, raises questions for modification, since modi-
fiers assign theta roles to the items they modify. I address these questions
below in this section. Motivation for this criterion is given at the end of ch.
2, sec. 5.)
Another loose string is the issue of what form of the Projection
Principle I am adopting. The Projection Principle of Chomsky (1981)
ensured that lexical properties would be reflected at all syntactic levels by
syntactic entities. For Chomsky (1986b), the phrase-structure component
is viewed as a "kind of 'projection' of lexical properties" (p. 81), and we
find the explicit claim that whatever element is "understood" in a
particular position is actually there in syntactic representation (p. 84).
This means that if a V, for example, takes a clausal argument in its lexical
structure, then one of its grammatical functions will be filled with a clause
(where the GFs are GF subject, DO, IO, object of a P). The obvious
question is, where do implicit arguments fit into the grammar given the
Projection Principle? Roeper (1987) has argued that implicit arguments
have syntactic functions (they can control PRO, for example), but they
do not occupy syntactic slots - they do not hold grammatical functions
such as subject, DO, IO, object of a preposition). Chomsky himself
(1986b, pp. 130-1) raises the question of what to do about implicit
arguments, and this is part of the reason that he allows subjects not to be
syntactically realized with his Extended Projection Principle.
I propose that we modify the Projection Principle to keep its essence by
simply saying that all lexical properties must be reflected at all syntactic
levels, but not necessarily by entities that bear GFs. Instead, so long as an
entity has syntactic functions (such as being able to control PRO), such an
entity will qualify as reflecting lexical properties at the syntactic levels.
Thus if a lexical item obligatorily takes an agentive argument in its lexical
structure, then when we put this lexical item into a syntactic structure, the
agentive argument must appear as an entity that may perform a syntactic
function - whether this argument appears explicitly (in some GF posi-
tion) or implicitly (perhaps in an affix, perhaps not).
In section 2.4 above I discussed Jackendoff s (1987b) nonlexical rule
for adding theme with arguments to verbs such as spray. At that point I
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raised the question of how such nonlexical rules affected the Projection
Principle. But, as I stated there, so long as we encode in the lexical
information of a verb the fact that it can undergo the nonlexical rule, then
lexical properties of the verb are still reflected in all the syntactic levels.
Thus I do not see Jackendoff s nonlexical rules as being a problem for the
Projection Principle.
In section 1.3 above I argued that the so-called aspectual verbs are not
themselves predicates, but, rather, part of the predicate headed by an
item in the clause embedded as a sister to the aspectual verb. But we saw
with (1-28) that the object of to in a clause with seem is a role player for
the predicate that seem is a part of. Let me repeat (1-28) for convenience:
(1-28) Jack seems to me [t to understand French pretty well].
The question now is whether such an analysis poses a problem for the
Projection Principle since the object of the to does not appear in the
lexical structure of understand, which is the head of the only predicate in
this sentence. The question is a tricky one. The Projection Principle says
that lexical properties must be encoded in the syntax. But its spirit is to
see the syntax as a reflection of lexical properties. So the syntactic
presence of the object of to but its absence from the lexical argument
structure of understand is problematic for the spirit, if not the word, of the
Projection Principle. And, unlike with our discussion of theme with
above, we cannot say that the ability to co-occur with seem is part of the
lexical information of understand. Instead, every predicate has the
potential of appearing with these aspectual verbs. And since this poten-
tial is not lexically idiosyncratic, it should not be built into the lexical
structure of individual lexical items. It would seem, then, that our
grammar must allow for items in the syntax which do not appear in the
lexical structure of a given lexical item, but which can be attracted into the
network of role players of the predicate headed by that lexical item.
A final point I would like to address here is where modification fits in. I
argued in section 1.4 above that in my approach to predication, there
must be a distinction made between modification and predication. And I
believe that the fact that a modifier (such as an AP) falls within the
maximal projection of the item it modifies (such as an N), so that it is an
intrinsic part of the sense of the entire phrase (such as being an intrinsic
part of the reference of the NP), is so different from the relationship of a
predicate to a role player that this difference demands recognition in the
theory.
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Others have identified modification with predication. For example,
Williams (1980) calls some AP predicates "modifiers" (p. 204), and
Higginbotham (1985) calls some AP modifiers "predicates" (p. 564). Yet
Williams' coindexing rules for predication will not apply to instances of
modification such as
(1-137) the big butterfly
since his coindexing rules coindex phrases only, but butterfly is an N and
not a phrasal level - so we cannot coindex the AP big with the N butterfly
in (1-137). Furthermore, Higginbotham is forced to posit a special rule of
Theta Identification to allow the AP big to discharge its theta role to the N
butterfly (where other discharge rules apply to phrases, again). Thus,
even though these linguists have not made the distinction in terminology
that I have made, their theories require special rules to handle the
assignment of a theta role from a modifying AP to the head N it modifies.
Certainly, however, there is much in common between predication and
modification, and any theory of grammar should capture the similarities,
as well as recognize the differences. In the present theory one way a
predicate and a modifier are similar is that the head of both assigns a theta
role to at least one argument. But I believe the similarity goes beyond
that.
The specific proposal I would like to make is that one of the theta
assignment principles I have given in this section can handle theta
assignment from a modifier to an N: the principle of External Theta
Assignment. That is, if we allow "argument" to be loosely understood to
include "head of an argument," a theta role can be assigned to an N and
not just to NP. That way External Theta Assignment can account for
theta assignment by modifiers, since the N receiving a theta role from an
A that heads a modifying AP is always external to the AP.
Given this analysis, a modifier will have an external argument. But
then it takes only a small relaxation of our definition of subject role player
in (1-121) to allow modifiers to have subject role players. That is, we need
say only that the external argument of a lexical item is the subject role
player of a predicate or a modifier headed by that lexical item. Now we
can see that the Functional Criterion in (1-136) can stand unchanged,
adequately handling instances in which an item receives a theta role both
because it is a role player of a predicate and because its head is being
modified (where I am assuming that if N gets a theta role, that theta role
will percolate up to N"), as in:
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(1-138) I saw [the tall kid].
V3^
The curved arrows in (1-138) indicate theta assignment. Here kid is the
subject role player for the modifier tall, as predicted by the Functional
Criterion.
I suggest further that the coindexing principles that I will develop in
chapter 2 for coindexing a subject role player and its predicate will also
hold for coindexing an N and its modifier. However, since modification is
not the focus of this work, I will not go any further with this suggestion,
but leave it for the interested reader to (trivially) confirm.
Let me also point out that modifiers can take more than one argument,
as in anyone talented at the piano. Here talented assigns a theta role both
to anyone, which it modifies, and to the piano. But the arguments of a
head of a modifier that appear in addition to the object modified will
always be internal to the maximal projection of the head of the predicate.
Therefore, Direct and Compositional Theta Assignment will easily
handle theta assignment to these arguments.
5 The feasibility and desirability of a formal definition tit predicate
At this point the reader who is familiar with the literature on predication
may still be longing for a formal definition of predicate within the
framework here. I will now show that such a formal definition is not
possible, and I suggest that it is not desirable, although the real evidence
for its undesirability comes from the fact that the present theory is more
nearly empirically adequate than the other theories with formal defini-
tions of predicate discussed in this book. That evidence is found in
chapters 2 through 5.
We will begin by considering an existing formal definition of predicate.
And the examination of this formal statement will allow us to see that
formal definitions of predicate that have appeared in the linguistic
literature accessible to nonlogicians are not helpful to us.
I have chosen the definition of Culicover and Wilkins (1986) because it
is recent, because it is well supported in their work, and because it has
points of similarity to most other formal definitions of predicate in the
nonphilosophical linguistic literature. It is not, however, useful to us with
the framework we are adopting here, for reasons we will see immediately.
(1-139) "A predicate is any non-propositional major category Xmax, immedi-
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ately dominated by Vn, which (a) bears no grammatical relation to the
verb, or (b) is an infinitival VP."
(From Culicover and Wilkins 1986, p. 121.)
First, we have seen that predicates need not be maximal projections
(that is, they need not be Xmax). In fact, the only predicates that are
maximal projections are headed ones that just happen to fill the maximal
projection of their head, unheaded predicate PPs and VPs (the idiomatic
cases - see sec. 2.5), and appositive relative clauses (see ch. 5, sec. 5).
Second, we are not restricting our predicates to being immediately
dominated by a projection of V. For example, to use a variation of a
sentence from Emonds (1985, p. 273), in (1-140) the phrase as Hamlet
predicates of Meryl, yet this phrase is immediately under S (or T) (where
S is the phrase consisting of a GF subject and the rest of the clause, and
where V is the node dominating Inflection and its sisters):
(1-140) Meryl as Hamlet would be a poor choice.
Third, we have made no restriction against our predicates' bearing a
grammatical relation to the verb. Culicover and Wilkins are using this
restriction to ban predicates (except infinitival VPs) from being assigned
theta roles. That is, they take grammatical relations to be what I have
been calling GFs (syntactic subject, DO, IO, O(bject of a) P(reposition),
but since their predication theory involves a coindexing rule that operates
in a structure they call R-structure and since R-structure is formed from
DS, the GFs of interest to the definition in (1-139) are what Chomsky
(1981) calls GF-theta. We differ, then, from the definition in (1-139) by
allowing items such as helpless in (l-108)a, repeated here for con-
venience, to be predicates (where the sole role player of helpless is John),
even though such a predicate is theta-marked by the verb, in this case,
rendered (see Emonds 1985, p. 83, and sec. 3 above).
(l-108)a. The medication rendered John helpless.
Fourth, we do not allow VP to be a predicate except when it is an
idiomatic VP or a headed predicate that just happens to fill the entire VP
(see sees. 2.5 and 2.6).
In sum, the theory presented here differs from Culicover and Wilkins'
on almost every formal aspect of their definition of predicate. I contend
that it would be impossible to write a formal definition of predicate in our
sense using syntactic terminology such as categories and projections of
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categories and domination information. This is trivially so because we are
allowing strings which do not form constituents to be predicates (such as
take . . . to task).
In chapters 2 through 5 of this book, I hope to make it clear that
definitions of predicate and theories of predication which gain their
formal properties by relying on syntactic configuration properties are not
desirable in any case, even if we were to allow only constituents to be
predicates. Predication is a semantic relationship and predicates are
semantic entities, and there is no one-to-one correlation between seman-
tic entities and syntactic entities. Hence, a useful definition of predicate
and a theoretically valid and empirically adequate theory of predication
must be built on semantic notions.
In this way definitions of predicate in the philosophical tradition turn
out to be more nearly consonant with mine than definitions in the GB
literature. Thus, as Bill Croft (personal communication) has pointed out
to me, what in natural language counts as a single predicate in first-order
logic is anything, with the only condition being that referring expressions
cannot be predicates or parts of predicates.
6 Semantic head versus structural head
There is one final distinction that needs to be made. As Abney (1986) has
pointed out, a phrase has a structural head and a semantic head. Thus the
structural head of a VP is the V and this is also, typically, its semantic
head. But Abney argues that the structural head need not be identical to
the semantic head, and he analyzes nominals in such a way that the
structural and semantic heads are not identical.
I do not follow Abney in his analysis of nominals for reasons ex-
traneous to the present work. However, we will see in chapters 3 and 4
that there are NPs in both Italian and English (and many other languages)
whose syntactic head is not identical to their semantic head. Thus I
analyze an NP such as (1-64), repeated here for convenience, as having
matto as its syntactic head, but Giorgio as its semantic head:
(1-64) quel matto di Giorgio
that madman of Giorgio
'that madman Giorgio'
Since theta roles are semantic entities, I contend that theta assignment
trickles down to the semantic head of a phrase. Of course, this will
become an issue only when the semantic and syntactic heads of a phrase
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are not identical. We will see the ramifications of this contention in
chapters 3 and 4.
7 Conclusion
We have defined several terms and offered three principles of theta
theory in this chapter. They are listed below for ease of reference as the
reader goes on to later chapters. We begin with the definitions and then
list the principles.
First, we never set aside a definition of predicate as a numbered
example. But we have developed the idea that a predicate is an event
lexical item with certain specifiers and modifiers, taking at least one role
player. We allow a lexical item to be not just a single word, but a string
that may or may not form a constituent and may or may not be continuous
(such as look after or take . . . to task or off his rocker):
(1-16) Head of a predicate: The lexical item which assigns a theta role to the
role players of a predicate containing that lexical item is the head of that
predicate.
(1-121) Subject Role Player: The external argument of a lexical item at SS is the
subject role player of the predicate headed by that lexical item.
(1-122) Subject Role Player ofN: If an N takes only one argument in the lexicon,
that argument is the subject role player of the predicate headed by the
N.
If an N has no external argument at SS but does have a genitive
argument, the genitive argument is the subject role player of the
predicate headed by the N.
Condition: (1-122) holds only if (1-121) does not apply.
(1-129) Subject Role Player ofN- definition two - The agentive argument of an
N is the subject role player of the predicate headed by the N.
Condition: (1-129) holds only if (1-121) and (1-122) do not apply.
(1-46) Principle of Coincidence: The arguments of a lexical item are the role
players of the predicate headed by that lexical item.
(1-109) Direct Theta Assignment: A lexical item assigns a theta role to its sister
arguments.
(1-110) Compositional Theta Assignment: A lexical item assigns a theta role to
its prepositional arguments.
(1-117) External Theta Assignment: A lexical item may assign a theta role to at
most one argument that is external to the maximal projection of (the
head of) the lexical item.
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(1-135) Theta Criterion: Every argument of a lexical item is assigned one and
only one theta role by that lexical item.
Every theta role of a lexical item is assigned to one and only one of its
arguments.
(1-136) Functional Criterion: If an XP receives a theta role from two non-
intersecting sources, then it must be the subject role player of at least
one of those sources.
We did not set aside any formulation of the Projection Principle as a
numbered example. However, we took the Projection Principle to
require that lexical properties be reflected in the syntactic levels by
syntactic entities, where syntactic entities need not fill GFs, but must be
able to function syntactically. Thus we see implicit arguments as no
problem for the Projection Principle. We noted, however, that the so-
called aspectual verbs call for a revision of the Projection Principle to the
effect that the grammar must allow role players to be attracted into an
event structure via the syntactic mechanism of embedding (where the
aspectual verbs take an embedded clause). I leave the exploration of the
details of this revision for future research.
The next chapter discusses the restrictions on coindexing a predicate
with its subject role player, which is a core part of a predication theory.
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